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SUMMARY 
Pakistan’s political economy over this period was characterized by high levels of 
conflict compounded by low economic growth. Conventional discourse explains this 
in terms of Pakistan’s weak governance: weak institutions, high levels of corruption, 
repeated challenges to its democracy and later in the period, the rise of Islamism. 
The political settlement that emerged in Pakistan towards the end of our period 
described a reproducible social balance that entailed persistently high levels of 
violence and poor economic development. Ironically, throughout this period 
Pakistan also made repeated attempts at pushing good governance reforms and 
liberalization. The political settlement analysis allows us to trace these problems to a 
growing crisis of legitimacy of the ruling coalition that has its roots in the strategies 
that the ruling coalition was persuaded to follow in a context of strong external 
influences. The alliance with the US and support for its war in Afghanistan in 
exchange for significant inflows of foreign rents provided the resources for a 
consolidation of a ruling coalition. The allocation of external rents related to security 
could be controlled from above and this enabled the ruling coalition to exclude many 
potentially powerful political organizations. But over time, this strategy made it 
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easier for many new political organizations to challenge the legitimacy of the ruling 
coalition that consisted over this period of one or other of the two main parties or 
the army. The increasing challenge to the legitimacy of organizations that 
constituted the ruling coalition provoked a growing level of violence as some 
excluded organizations were effectively challenging the parameters of the 
established political settlement in Pakistan. This analysis suggests that there are 
structural but avoidable features in the combination of institutions and political 
strategies that powerful organizations have supported in Pakistan that can help to 
explain the evolution of greater instability and poorer development performance. 
This analysis identifies a different set of issues as the source of some of these 
problems compared to the common explanations in terms of the weakness of ‘good 
governance’ and the challenges of rising Islamism. 
The evolution of the political settlement in Pakistan in our period of interest cannot 
be understood without reference to the history of modern Pakistan and of partition 
where independence was thrust on the Pakistani state as the outcome of the 
exigencies of Congress-led politics in British India. The Pakistani state in 1947 was 
faced with the task of establishing social and political control over a territory that 
historically had strong social and political organizations that were not integrated into 
the political organization of the Muslim League. From 1958 the attempt to construct 
a viable ruling coalition were shelved with the onset of military rule and the 
prioritization of economic development. However, the strategies adopted for 
economic growth were themselves exclusionary and left out important 
constituencies. These strategies contributed to the breakup of the country in 1971. 
Subsequent attempts to consolidate a viable ruling coalition in a political settlement 
that was developmental were significantly constrained by a number of factors. The 
influx of external rents associated with the wars in Afghanistan and the perception of 
a permanent threat from India allowed a relatively narrow group of (political and 
military) organizations to dominate the political system. The process of gradual 
inclusion of intermediate class organizations into the ruling coalition was therefore 
slower in Pakistan compared to India with damaging consequences for political 
stability in the long run.  
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It is in the context of this specific political settlement that Pakistan embarked on 
liberalization and Structural Adjustment Programmes in the late 1980s and the 
1990s. The features of this political settlement explain why the outcomes of 
liberalization were poor. Pakistan did not have the productive capabilities to benefit 
from greater market access, nor were there significant productive capabilities close 
enough to the competitiveness frontier to benefit from the compulsions of the 
market and the financing opportunities for capability development. In contrast in 
contemporary India the effects of liberalization were better because there were 
some industrial sectors close to the competitiveness and some of these could benefit 
from support mechanisms of the state which allowed them to raise their 
competitiveness. More importantly, the ideological and political strategies through 
which Pakistani ruling coalitions were constructed were beginning to unravel 
because of Pakistan’s growing involvement in western supported strategies in 
Afghanistan. The easy sources of external rents allowed Pakistan’s military and 
political elite to dominate their organizations from above and the concentration of 
sources of rents disadvantaged excluded organizations in the political competition. 
The adverse dynamics of this strategy became particularly evident after 9/11. On the 
one hand the concentrated rent flows controlled by the leadership of the ruling 
coalition strengthened the Musharraf regime but on the other hand, it became 
easier to mobilize against the ruling coalition whose legitimacy was increasingly 
questioned. The poor outcomes associated with liberalization in Pakistan can 
therefore be explained with reference to features of its political settlement. It 
resulted in the exposure of Pakistan’s economic organizations to market competition 
when most were far from the competitiveness frontier and the ruling coalition was 
increasingly under challenge from excluded organizations that were now aiming at a 
fundamental change in the political settlement. Faced with these challenges, the 
ruling coalition had neither the time horizon nor the implementation capabilities to 
carry out developmental rent allocations. 
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7.1 Introduction 
Pakistan’s birth was accompanied by much sound and fury that yet signified a 
hopeful, if uncertain future for the 31 million people who made up its eastern and 
western flanks. ‘Maimed and mutilated’ at its birth (Jalal 1990), Pakistan was the 
price Jawaharlal Nehru and the Congress were prepared to pay for having a strong 
and stable central government in India (Hasan 2001). The new country inherited 
some of the most underdeveloped parts of British India. All the major urban centres 
(Delhi, Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta) major industrial locations, the most 
important ports, much of the railway network and even the majority of the 
bureaucracy remained in the newly independent Indian state. Pakistan’s main urban 
centres were Lahore, the port town of Karachi and Dhaka in East Pakistan and its 
most valuable inherited infrastructure from the British was the canal-irrigated area 
of west Punjab which had helped the fertile Punjab plains to become one of the 
most agriculturally productive in the sub-continent. As for East Pakistan it was even 
less developed. It was made up of the rural hinterland that supplied raw materials to 
the industrially advanced western part of Bengal, now modern day West Bengal in 
India. And while Dhaka was a thriving urban centre during Mughal times before 
modern day Calcutta had been founded, it was British Calcutta which became the 
second city of the Empire. To put matters in perspective the contribution of industry 
to Pakistan’s national income was a mere one per cent and though East Pakistan 
grew 70 per cent of India’s raw jute the province did not have a signal large jute mill 
(I. Ali and Malik 2009).  
 
Population 180 million 
Gross Domestic Product 2011 current USD 211.1 bn  
GDP per capita current 2012 USD 1290 
Capital Output Ratio 3.6 
Investment in Fixed Capital as share of GDP 11.8 % 
Percentage of population below poverty line 22 % 
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Table 7.1. Pakistan Economic Characteristics 
Source: Various, (census.gov.pk), (World Bank World Development Indicators), 
(Bloomberg), (Asia Development Report 2007), (State Bank of Pakistan) 
 
Though Pakistan has had periods of stability, instability and violence have grown 
over the last two decades. This has contributed to the slowing down of growth in the 
Pakistani economy with GDP growth of 3.8 per cent and per capita GDP growth of 
only 2 per cent over 2008-10, the lowest in South Asia. The period since 1980 divides 
into three phases relevant for analysing the evolution of Pakistan’s political 
settlement. A common theme in all these phases has been a more or less intense 
contestation between included and excluded groups for access to the political and 
economic rents controlled by the ruling coalition. Pakistan’s political instability 
reflects a failure to achieve a distribution of rents across organizations that reflected 
a distribution of power that was accepted by all major organizations as the real 
distribution of power. Several factors contributed to the failure to achieve a balance 
between the distribution of benefits across organizations and their relative power 
that could have achieved significantly lower levels of political violence. First, the 
concentration of significant security-related rents in the hands of a narrow ruling 
elite supported their perception that their relative organizational power was greater 
than it actually was, and reduced their willingness to compromise with other 
organizations. Some of these organizations represented regional elites like those in 
Baluchistan, the tribal areas of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP), the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Muhajirs (Muslim immigrants from India) 
largely based in the cities of Karachi and Hyderabad. Secondly, political organizations 
led by the intermediate classes had always been organizationally less developed in 
Pakistan compared to other parts of India. This meant that when the legitimacy of 
the ruling organizations began to be seriously challenged new organizations often 
emerged with radical agendas. Many of these organizations were willing to use 
violence to challenge the position of the dominant political organizations, and were 
not just trying to capture a bigger share or rents. The mobilizing ideology that was 
often used by new political mobilizations was Islam, much as the violent anti-state 
movement of indigenous people in neighbouring India has used a Maoist ideology.  
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These distributive conflicts are very similar to those in other developing countries 
but an understanding of the specific problems faced by Pakistan requires an 
understanding of the history of its creation out of British India. First, there was no 
geographical or cultural grouping that could be identified as Pakistan within 
undivided India even as late as the 1930s. Independence was thrust upon it in 1947 
in large part by the Indian Congress party that was unwilling to accommodate 
Muslim demands for representation in a Hindu dominated India (Jalal 1985; A. Roy 
1993; Anderson 2012). Secondly, the areas the Pakistani state inherited already had 
strong social and political organizations, while the Muslim League, the party that 
won Pakistan, had not been historically strong in these areas of India. The new 
Pakistani state dominated by the Muslim League ruling coalition thus had an 
immediate challenge in enforcing its authority from the outset. Thirdly, in the early 
years, the greater population of East Pakistan and the concentration of economic, 
military and bureaucratic power in West Pakistan led to a constitutional crisis over 
the power sharing formula between the two wings. Compounding all these problems 
was the threat perception from India. These challenges led to an unstable political 
settlement in the years immediately after 1947 and contributed to the failure of 
Pakistani policy makers to come up with  broad-based employment generating 
policies. The turnaround only came with the military takeover of 1958 which 
imposed military rule in Pakistan and was associated with a vulnerable 
patrimonialism that could nevertheless achieve some progress in industrial policy 
and accumulation (M. H. Khan 2012a).  
 
Period GDP GDP per capita 
1960-71 (Ayub) 6.8 4.1 
1971-77 (Bhutto) 4.2 1.2 
1977-88 (Zia) 6.6 3.2 
1988-99 (PPP and PML-N) 4 1.1 
1999-2008 (Mussharraf) 5 3.2 
2008-2010 (PPP) 3.8 2 
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Table 7.2: Growth rates of GDP and GDP per capita under Different Regimes, 
Pakistan 1960-2010 (constant 2000 US$) 
Source: World Development Indicators 2011, World Bank 
 
A comparison of the organizational basis of the early Congress and the Muslim 
League is instructive. The Congress has a long organizational history, being founded 
in 1885 with an extensive grassroots membership that remained significant at least 
till the 1950s. In contrast, the League founded in 1906 was initially representative of 
elite Muslims in India and did not even have the intention of establishing Pakistan. It 
did not have an organizational structure in the parts of India that became Pakistan 
that was equal to the task of building Pakistan’s new institutions in ways compatible 
with the local distributions of power (Jalal 1990). While formal political organizations 
were weak in these areas, there were strong informal organizations exercising 
authority and power using informal institutions of ‘biradri’ which are networks based 
on kinship groups, both patriarchal and patrilineal. Ethnic identities and 
organizations were also strong in the different provinces making up Pakistan. The 
military rapidly emerged as a focal point for the new state not only because of the 
weakness of the dominant political organization in accommodating all the interests 
in society, but also because of the environment of armed conflict with India that 
immediately affected the disputed territory of Kashmir. The dispute is still 
unresolved and Kashmir’s accession to India remains controversial given the 
compelling body of evidence showing that India manipulated the accession of 
Kashmir without the support of the Kashmiri public (Anderson 2012).  
The military takeover of 1958 resulted in high levels of economic growth under 
General Ayub Khan in the 1960s and Pakistan’s economic growth was in general 
higher than that of India from the 1960s till around 1990 (Table 7.3). Ayub’s military 
intervention changed the distribution of power and put the armed forces in a 
dominant position. The political settlement was a vulnerable patrimonialism in terms 
of the categorization in Chapter Three, with the ruling coalition enjoying enough 
enforcement capabilities to run a basic industrial policy but also being vulnerable to 
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repeated challenges from excluded organizations that occasionally required the use 
of violence and repression against them.  
Growth Rates % India Pakistan  
GDP  
  
1960-80 3.5 5.5 
1980-90 5.6 6.1 
1990-00 5.8 3.7 
2000-05 6.7 4.9 
2005-10 7.8 3.9 
Per Capita GDP  
  
1960-80 1.2 2.6 
1980-90 3.4 3.5 
1990-00 4.0 1.2 
2000-05 5.2 2.4 
2005-10 6.4 2.1 
Table 7.3  Comparison of India and Pakistan in terms of GDP and GDP per capita 
growth rates 
Source: (World Bank 2012)  
In the 1970s a democratic order emerged with Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (the 
PPP) emerging as the dominant party. With elements of similarity with Modi’s BJP, 
Bhutto maintained his political dominance using informal threats and sometimes 
violence against political opponents. We will describe this later as a similar type of 
constrained patrimonialism with authoritarian clientelist characteristics. The return 
of army rule under Zia in 1977 marked the reversion to another period of vulnerable 
patrimonialism but this time the economic policies and institutions began to change. 
Pakistan’s military was now more concerned with establishing a new set of political 
organizations that would support their rule than in building productive capabilities. 
The rents from the Afghan war ensured inward resource flows that kept overall 
growth rates high without adding to competitive capabilities. Zia’s political strategy 
was not very successful in by-passing established political organizations like the PPP, 
and his attempt to create new political organizations brought in elites like Nawaz 
Sharif in the Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz (PML-N) who were quite similar to the 
elites in the PPP. Zia’s death in 1988 brought in a period of weak democratic 
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governance with the PPP and the PML-N alternating in power till Musharraf and the 
army again came back in 1999. Throughout the democratic period of intense 
competitive clientelism, liberalization strategies were implemented, often in stealth 
by technocratic caretaker governments that ruled in between elections. 
Musharraf’s military government was yet another period of vulnerable 
patrimonialism. As in Zia’s regime, Pakistan’s elites enjoyed another period of 
significant security-related aid inflows, this time associated with another but much 
less legitimate (in Pakistani eyes) US intervention in Afghanistan. Once again, the aid 
inflows created a perception of strength in ruling organizations that were actually 
facing increasing social challenges and demands for inclusion from new social 
mobilizations. The failure of dominant political organizations to make the 
compromises that may have allowed evolutionary changes in the political settlement 
is, in our analysis, the source of the instability that began to grip Pakistan from the 
mid-2000s onwards. In particular, we argue that the problem of instability was not 
just the result of military rule in Pakistan. Rather, both the military and a few 
relatively elitist political parties could access a much more centralized control over 
rents than in other parts of South Asia, particularly in the context of security-related 
aid inflows. As a result, they jointly failed to achieve the inclusion of significant new 
intermediate class mobilizations within political rent distribution arrangements.  
Pakistan’s army as an organization is most often held responsible for the country’s 
instability. The army does indeed appear ‘overdeveloped’ with respect to the size of 
the economy and the state, and it does behave as if it has the authority to act to 
represent the popular will against corrupt political parties, but in reality it is mostly 
engaged in protecting the status quo (Alavi 1983a; Jalal 1990). It usually maintains 
and protects the interests of the current ruling coalition and its attempts to create a 
new ruling coalition have usually resulted in the construction of a new coalition with 
very similar characteristics to previous ones. In reality, the actual power of informal 
organizations and networks that permeate Pakistani society have meant that while 
formal power often appears highly concentrated in Pakistan, the enforcement 
capabilities of ruling coalition have been weak, and formal rules have been 
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significantly modified in reality. As in the case of Gujarat in Chapter Four, a state 
cannot be characterized as developmental just because it is formally pro-business or 
even if it able to implement rent allocations to business organizations. More 
complex enforcement capabilities are required to make a state developmental in 
terms of achieving developmental outcomes. In terms of this criterion Gujarat is not 
a developmental state. Similarly, the Pakistani Army is often accused of not using its 
apparently high enforcement capabilities to enforce developmental outcomes and 
instead appears to exaggeratedly focus on external adventures. In fact, the Pakistani 
army arguably lacks the organizational power base in broader society to enforce the 
difficult institutional rules that would be necessary for developmental outcomes. 
Viable developmental strategies would have been to reconstruct the composition of 
the ruling coalition or devise institutional interventions that were developmental but 
also enforceable in this political settlement. Instead, the availability of easy rents for 
any ruling coalition that played along with external strategic interests in the area, the 
strength of informal organizations that the ruling coalition failed to accommodate 
and indeed the fact that the army perceives important strategic threats to Pakistan 
resulted in institutional strategies that were neither developmental nor capable of 
delivering stability in the longer term.  
In contrast, the mainstream ‘good governance’ analysis of Pakistan suggests that 
Pakistan’s instability is due to its weak democratic institutions and so the 
strengthening of these institutions could turn the country’s fortunes around 
(Candland 2000; Haque 2000; Easterly 2001). Interestingly, this type of analysis 
cannot explain why neighbouring India which has been a democracy for most of the 
time and has had elections that have been largely free and fair has also experienced 
growing levels of political fragmentation, contestation and violence. The difference is 
that the Indian political settlement at the federal level has evolved to a competitive 
clientelism with characteristics of ‘vulnerable maturity’ where no one organization 
can imagine that it can dominate all the others (M. H. Khan 2011b; P. Roy 2012). In 
the context of a complex society with a proliferation of organizations, this at least 
allows the excluded enough of a hope of inclusion through ‘normal’ clientelist 
politics. This can entail quite a lot of ‘normal’ violence but keeps most aspiring 
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organizations away from radical strategies to overthrow the state. In Pakistan, the 
army has for a long time been able to claim dominance and by association the 
parties that have ruled in close association with the army have followed strategies of 
dominating politics from above. But unlike Gujarat’s authoritarian clientelism where 
Modi’s ruling coalition was able to browbeat excluded organizations to be quiescent, 
in Pakistan the excluded have been able to increasingly challenge the legitimacy of 
the ruling elites, increasingly using the critique of radical Islamism, and adding to the 
centrifugal forces of regional and ethnic separatist movements. 
In the period studied in the thesis, from 1980 to around 2010, the evolution of the 
Pakistani political settlement had two significant effects. The first was a loss of 
enforcement capacity on the part of the ruling coalition because of its ebbing 
legitimacy, which resulted in weaker enforcement of all formal institutions and 
growing levels of violence. While violence has also been growing in India, the 
distribution of power across organizations supported by institutional rent allocation 
is somewhat more stabilizing in averting radical strategies on the part of the 
excluded. This is not always the case, as the case of the Maoist uprisings and regional 
separatist movements in India testify, but the level of challenge is arguably higher in 
Pakistan. The second effect was low levels of economic growth associated with 
sustained attempts at liberalization and good governance reforms, again in a context 
of weak enforcement. Liberalization in Pakistan was associated with low and 
declining growth as is evident from Tables 7.2 and 7.3 above. This period will be 
analyzed in greater detail in Section 7.7. 
What was interesting about liberalization in Pakistan was that the most significant 
moves towards liberalization were made by unelected ‘caretaker’ governments that 
served between elections, made up of technocrats, with the backing of the military. 
They reflected the ideological preference of increasingly weak ruling elites who 
lacked the power to enforce any pragmatic developmental strategies. The political 
and policy establishment were willing to adopt the recommendations of 
international financial institutions and donors largely because they lacked any 
alternative strategy of their own. In particular, they did not consider the viability of 
12 
 
liberalization in a country where economic organizations were in most cases not 
globally competitive in any sector. Even more critically for Pakistan, the limited 
implementation of liberalization actually further weakened already weak 
bureaucratic organizations through administrative restructuring and decentralization. 
The reforms were ostensibly driven by a desire to prevent the state from capturing 
public goods and hence ensuring economic growth but in reality the opposite 
happened. Weakening state capacities arguably led to more decentralized rent 
capture and declining service delivery. In contrast, in India a few sectors were close 
enough to the competitiveness frontier to engage in a further spurt of rent-financed 
learning in the 1980s which led to the emergence of at least a few globally 
competitive sectors (M. H. Khan 2011b).  
Declining political and economic stability can open up a vicious cycle of declining 
legitimacy and weaker enforcement capabilities leading to even more adverse 
economic and political outcomes. This process has a number of elements. First, the 
time horizon of the ruling coalition can become shorter as it faces greater 
uncertainty. This can result in the creation and capture of quick rents that are more 
likely to be unproductive and predatorial. Secondly, this can lead to the ruling 
coalition facing even stronger contestation by emerging political organizations, some 
of whom may adopt radical strategies of overthrowing the system. Finally the ruling 
coalition can lose the ability to provide any support for capability development in 
economic sectors, and in particular in manufacturing. Pakistan’s growth in the 1990s 
and beyond has been driven by the financial sector, real estate and associated 
services that do not need an effective industrial policy but which also provide few 
Kaldorean dynamic economies. Economic growth becomes vulnerable, providing 
limited employment generation and this too strengthens excluded political 
organizations by supporting the perception that the system is not working. 
7.2 Setting the Context 
The constraints to growth and stability in Pakistan can be traced back to the loss of 
legitimacy of the political organizations that could constitute its ruling coalition as a 
result of their sustained involvement in unpopular policies associated with US 
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interventions in the region and economic liberalization. While this describes the 
current situation an understanding of the evolution of the political settlement 
requires a look at the history of the partition of India. Indeed, we argue that it is 
interesting to remind ourselves about the history of Islam in South Asia because this 
provides insights into the complex communal relationships affecting not just 
partition but also contemporary South Asia as well. India’s internal structural 
dynamics which requires a politics of accommodation and concession in keeping a 
continental country together has an often overlooked impact on Pakistan’s polity. 
There is an unarticulated policy of the ruling Indian elite to convince those wanting 
or threatening secession that breaking away from India will have huge costs. If 
Pakistan can have good relationships with India and perform as well as India, this is 
not a good signal to a multitude of other would-be Indian secessionists. As a result 
India’s aim is to have strategic and economic dominance in the region to make this 
convincing and credible. This is also why any resolution of the dispute in the Kashmir 
Valley on any terms that signal Indian weakness is off the table even if Kashmir 
imposes huge costs on India. The Indian position has inevitably impacted on 
Pakistan’s security-dominated political settlement from its birth as has been 
documented in Ayesha Jalal’s seminal work on these issues (Jalal 1990). It is 
important to revisit this framework at a time when Pakistan seems to be facing its 
worst crisis since 1971, the year Bangladesh was created out of a united Pakistan.  
Another focus of our analysis will be the ideology of nation building that led to the 
growing ‘securitization’ of Pakistan's political economy. By securitization we refer to 
two parallel discourses applied to Pakistan–that of providing human security and the 
other preventing it from becoming a ‘failed state’. All other developmental agendas 
increasingly became subservient to these. The Indian subcontinent was partitioned 
on the basis of a ‘two nation theory’, referring to the Islamic and Hindu ‘nations’ but 
now has the distinction of housing three countries, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. 
As Jalal has pointed out, Pakistan was ‘painfully’ carved out ‘ostensibly’ as a 
homeland for British India’s Muslims (Jalal 1990). Subsequent revisionist historical 
accounts have pointed out that far from being a spontaneous organic process it was 
the result of a competition for controlling rents between the Indian National 
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Congress (Congress) and the Muslim League in undivided India. Congress refused to 
admit the League’s well founded contention that Indian Muslims needed some 
constitutional arrangement to protect their interests and the League refused to 
accept that the Congress could represent Muslim interests in a first-past-the-post 
polity where India Muslims (around a third of the population) would be a perpetual 
minority (Jalal 1990; A. Roy 1993; M. H. Khan 2009b, 2010, 2011a; Anderson 2012). 
Pakistan emerged in 1947 not because the Indian Muslims had a well-articulated 
plan for Pakistan based on a shared idea of national identity. Rather, it emerged 
because all the propositions that the Muslim League came up with to achieve some 
level of constitutional protection for Muslims were rejected by Congress. Once it was 
born, however, Pakistan’s leaders had to construct a national ideology that asserted 
that its independence movement was always about creating a separate homeland 
for Muslims (Alavi 1989; Jalal 1990; I. Ali 2002; Talbot 2005). To be sure a small 
Muslim constituency in India had imagined an independent, sovereign Pakistan from 
the 1930s, but most Indian Muslims, including Mohammed Ali Jinnah, were not 
committed to an independent country till as late as 1946, when the final 
negotiations broke down (Jalal 1985, 1990; A. Roy 1993; M. H. Khan 2010; Anderson 
2012). One reason for this was that India’s Muslims were territorially dispersed, and 
the regions where they were concentrated, in the east and the west, they had local 
majorities and did not feel threatened enough to support the Muslim League. 
Whether a united India would have been successful is anybody’s guess but it is clear 
that partition was the outcome of conscious and expedient decisions taken by the 
Indian National Congress to maintain its dominance even if that meant losing some 
territory to Pakistan (Hasan 1998; Anderson 2012).  
This reading of history is inconvenient for both Pakistan and India, but an objective 
analysis is essential for understanding the implications of partition for contemporary 
politics. In India the national myth is that the Congress did everything it could to 
keep the country together but failed in the face of the League’s communal politics. In 
Pakistan, the equivalent Pakistani myth is that Pakistan was created to protect 
Muslims from Hindu dominance. The logic of prioritizing security in Pakistan is the 
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direct result of this (mis)reading of the history that led to partition. The security 
imperative of Pakistan’s military and political leadership continues to inform critical 
strategies like its pact with the US. The Pakistani perception that India may use 
military force to overrun it is particularly ironical given that it was the unwillingness 
of the majority Hindus to share power and rents with Muslims that was ultimately 
behind the Congress decision to push Muslims out in 1947. Interestingly, 
contemporary India has a significant anti-Pakistan and anti-Muslim rhetoric as part 
of its political discourse primarily driven by the right wing Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP) to challenge the ‘secular’ banner of the Congress.  
Both countries have thus manipulated history at various levels to construct two 
nationalist narratives: one based on the idea of an Islamic nation facing an existential 
threat from India and the other based on a claim of secular inclusiveness. Both 
narratives deny significant historical facts and processes driving the partition of 1947 
and the strategic calculations that led to the respective nation-states emerging. The 
consequence of partition was the gradual rise of ‘soft Hindutva’ in India (Engineer 
1995; Assadi 2002; Rangarajan 2005; Banjerjee 2007; Shani 2007; Desai 2011). A 
gradual diffusion of markers of Hindu identity in culture, media and even the state is 
a reflection of a gradual erosion of the formal secular commitment of the Indian 
state. The Indian constitution still remains robustly secular but the informal norms of 
the Indian polity have gradually become more Hindu-centric. In a similar way, while 
Jinnah was hardly a religious person and was more concerned with the political goal 
of protecting the access to rents and opportunities for Muslims, the logic of partition 
gradually led to a growing Islamization of Pakistan. In particular, excluded political 
groups in Pakistan have increasingly mobilized by challenging the Islamic credentials 
of the ruling elite in Pakistan, particularly when the international alliances of the 
latter involve supporting the US in regional wars. The growth of radical Islamism was 
accelerated in the 1980s by General Zia-ul-Haq’s US-supported strategy of arming 
non-state Islamist actors to fight against the Soviets. By all accounts this process 
spawned a wide variety of non-state military organizations and by the 2000s, forces 
like the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan or TTP began to threaten the Pakistani political 
establishment itself (Lieven 2011). Many observers hold Pakistan’s Afghan policy 
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under Zia responsible for the rise of Islamic mobilization. However, we argue that 
there were deeper fissures in the construction of the ruling coalition in Pakistan and 
given the country’s founding mythologies, significant challenges to the legitimacy of 
the ruling elites were likely to emerge sooner or later in the language of a betrayal of 
these ideals.  
A distinguishing feature of our analysis relative to most political economy analyses of 
Pakistan is in the assessment of the significance of the army in explaining Pakistan’s 
developmental trajectory. The implicit pact between the Pakistani Army and 
business and landed elites, and the army’s dominance of Pakistani politics and 
economics have been identified and discussed in many outstanding contributions 
beginning with Ayesha Jalal’s seminal work on this topic  (Rashid and Gardezi 1983; 
Jalal 1990; Cohen 1994; Jalal 1995b; Rizvi 2000; Arif 2001; Rizvi 2001; Cheema 2003; 
Rizvi 2003; Zaidi 2005; Siddiqa 2007; Haqqani 2010). However we contend that the 
Army is not an all-powerful monolith, and rules only because the dominant political 
and economic organizations have worked closely in tandem with it. The effect has 
been to monopolize a significant share of rents at relatively high levels of the social 
hierarchy, to the detriment of achieving a political settlement with low levels of 
violent contestation. If the Army as an organization were indeed powerful vis-à-vis 
other organizations, it may have been able to create a developmental along the lines 
of Taiwan or South Korea both of which were initially led by strong military-backed 
governments. But in fact Pakistan’s army did not have the enforcement capacity to 
pursue a developmental agenda in the 1960s and its enforcement capacity was even 
weaker in the 1980s or 1990s. By the 2000s, the capability of the army to control a 
significant part of rent allocations from above in alliance with its political and 
business allies began to be challenged by significant political mobilizations that were 
often informal and violent. This is why we argue that the role of the Pakistani army 
has to be analysed in the context of a broader range of organizational mobilizations 
that describe the political settlement in Pakistan and its evolution. 
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Figure 7. 1. Languages in Pakistan 
Source: http://ethnicityinpakistan.blogspot.co.uk/ (accessed 03/06/2012) 
 
Note: the provincial boundaries of Pakistan in this map though not marked out 
correspond roughly to the Baluch (Baluchistan), Sindhi (Sindh), Punjabi (Punjab) and 
Pushtu (Khyberpakhtunkhwa) speaking areas. Some of the Pashtu speaking regions 
of the country’s northwest also make up the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. 
Chitrali is spoken in the northernmost district of Khyberpakhtunkhwa. The Shina and 
Balti speaking areas are in Pakistan’s Gilgit-Baltistan. 
 
Another element in the political violence and instability that intensified in Pakistan in 
the 2010s was the growing militancy of the long marginalized tribes of FATA 
especially in North and South Waziristan. This is often explained in terms of a 
strengthening of fundamentalist Islamic movements. However, the growing tensions 
in the region were also the outcome of a breakdown of traditional social structures 
18 
 
in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the FATA brought about by economic changes and the 
conflict in Afghanistan. In this sense these conflicts had much in common with the 
Maoist movements in India’s hinterland, where marginalized social groups engaged 
in violent attempts to overthrow ruling elites rather than attempting to enter their 
patron-client networks. The ideological discourse in Pakistan was obviously different 
given its history, but the structural features of the conflict had much in common. At 
the heart of this process was a significant level of exclusion of these societies from 
the political rent allocation processes of standard patron-client politics combined 
with shocks that destroyed the legitimacy of the established political organizations at 
the very moment when inclusion became necessary to avoid conflict.  
In Pakistan, the loss of legitimacy of mainstream elites came from a foreign policy 
crisis. Pakistan’s external rents in the 1990s were conditional on support for the US 
offensive in Afghanistan. While Pakistan carried out some operations in pursuit of 
this objective, its strategic interests in Afghanistan also meant it could not afford to 
fully abandon the Taliban if it wanted to ensure an eventual Pakistan-friendly 
government in Kabul  (Lieven 2011). At the same time Pakistan’s policy of ignoring 
US drone attacks in these areas and the Pakistani Army’s own actions against in the 
Swat region contributed to fundamentally weaken the legitimacy of the Pakistani 
state in these marginal societies. A more orthodox Islamist ideology began to replace 
the ‘Pakhtunwali’, the social code of the Pathan tribes in the region (Ahmed 1980; 
Economist 2009; Lieven 2011). The rise of the Taliban in Pakistan is often mistakenly 
conflated with irredentist terrorism. We argue that strategies of violence are better 
understood in the context of a broader analysis of processes of mobilization and the 
success or failure of accommodation of new groups within an evolving political 
settlement.  
7.3 History of Islam in the Indian Sub-Continent: Hostage to Polemics 
The history of Islam in the Indian subcontinent has to be distinguished from the 
political mobilizations around religious, ethnic, caste and other identities as 
competing groups have attempted to acquire the organizational power to capture 
and retain rents through the political process (Thapar 1989; Jalal 1990). The reason 
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why a delineation of history is so important to the formation of the countries within 
the sub-continent is that each has constructed its identity based on the same 
sequence of historical events but with starkly contrasting interpretations of these 
events. Recent revisionist histories have demonstrated how a strand of Indian 
nationalism was implicitly Hindu nationalism and in certain contexts continues to be 
so (Gilmartin 1979; Thapar 1989; Islam 1992; Chatterji 1995; Habib 1997; L. A. 
Gordon 2001).  
Islam had an established though limited presence in India much before Islamic rule 
was established in Delhi. By the 7th century CE Calicut in southern India was India’s 
foremost entrepot with already established trade links with Rome and the Middle 
East now being extended to Arab Muslim traders. By the 14th century CE the growing 
numbers of Arab Muslim traders were well assimilated into the society of the Hindu 
Zamorin kings of the region (Dale 1990; Osella 2008). However the establishment of 
Muslim rule on the Indian sub-continent began with the conquest of Sind under the 
Iraqi governor in 711 CE which resulted in the province’s incorporation into the 
Umayyad caliphate. Mahmud of Ghazni (Ghaznavi in present day Afghanistan) 
invaded Punjab in the early 11th century CE but did not establish his rule. Another 
Afghan king Muhammad of Ghor declared himself independent from Ghazni and 
established a kingdom spanning the north western Indian sub-continent. His 
successor Qutb-ud-din-Aibak shifted the capital from Lahore to Delhi and became 
the first Muslim ruler of the Indian sub-continent. In India it is a measure of the 
contemporary polemics involved that the Sultans of Ghaznavi and Ghori are singled 
out as ruthless conquerors, especially Ghaznavi’s campaign in Gujarat which involved 
the looting of a Hindu temple, Somnath. That incident like so many others of similar 
nature in world history is more ‘a rhetoric of state building’ (Fearon 2010) or as 
Ahmad observes in both the case of Somnath and other temple desecrations it 
served as a ‘pseudo religious wartime sport’ to serve as ‘proof for the self-
satisfaction of the invaders that the wars they were waging were not for… the 
carving out of an empire, but had religious justification’ (Ahmad 1964). Thapar has 
gone on to say that contemporary Hindu accounts do not ascribe much importance 
to the plunder of Somnath (Thapar 2005). Yet this has been mythified by the now 
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mainstream right including the BJP as a wound on Hindu consciousness and identity 
wreaked by Islam in India. In Pakistan on the other hand Ghaznavi and Ghauri are 
short and medium range ballistic missiles capable of hitting Indian targets, so named 
in an obvious play on the names of the two Sultans who made successful forays into 
‘Hindu’ India. At the time of Mahmud of Ghazni’s invasion Hinduism was not the 
Brahmanical religion recognized as such today but a collection of diverse sects and 
cults which only gradually came to resemble the Brahmanical religion of today. The 
term Hindu according to Thapar was initially used as a geographical and ethnic 
marker or for the indigenous population and not as a monolithic community (Thapar 
1968, 1989, 1996, 2005). This identity came into being in the 19th century CE under 
British rule when access to jobs and resources were dependent on the size of the 
community, hence a mobilization on the lines of an upper caste Brahman dominated 
identity became necessary (Prakash 1988; Thapar 1989, 1996; Habib 1997). 
The period between 1206 CE to 1525 CE saw various Muslim dynasties consolidate 
their hold over north India in various degrees. Babar, a Chagatai Turk established 
Mughal rule in India from 1526 CE, making India under Mughal rule one of the 
largest empires in the world in the 16th and 17th centuries. The revenue system and 
land records formulated under Akbar the most famous Mughal king were used by 
the British and continue to be the basis of current revenue administration in some 
parts of India. For this period historians have outlined various scenarios of what the 
relationship between the two communities could have been. While not attempting a 
detailed analysis it is possible to say they straddled a spectrum from syncretic co-
existence (Fearon 2010) to exhibiting political tensions (Thapar 2006) to ‘an insular 
co-existence’ (Ahmad 1964). However despite attempts to describe this phase of 
Muslim expansion in India as colonization by the founders of Hindu right wing 
organizations writing in the early 20th century CE historical evidence shows no 
support for this discourse.  Whatever be the approach ones takes given 
historiographical evidence it is not possible to conclude that the two communities 
were at perpetual war with each other or that the two did not influence each other 
in very fundamental ways. The detailed socio-political dynamics between Islam and 
Hinduism are beyond the scope of this paper but one would still need some 
21 
 
references to these processes to fully grasp what happened in 1947. Eaton 
summarizes the dynamic effectively when he calls Islam both the dependent variable 
through ‘accretion’ or natural growth and the independent variable through the 
‘reform’ process where Islam is posited as socially distinct (Eaton 1985). In the 
deeper south there were alternating Hindu-Muslim dynasties at odds with the neat 
periodicity some scholars, especially earlier Orientalist ones and from current right 
wing organizations have tried to outline for Indian history of Ancient (Hindu)-
Medieval (Islamic)-Modern (British Colonization and the independence movement) 
(Thapar 1968, 1989, 1996; Habib 1997).  
The growth of Islam in South Asia was achieved not through systematized and 
violent conversions but through a mechanism of deep rooted social transformation 
especially in the provinces of Punjab and Bengal and Sind. Bengal, Sind and western 
Punjab were areas outside the immediate primary influence of Brahmanical 
Hinduism at the time of the spread of Muslim rule in India. They were also far away 
from the centre of Mughal rule strongly suggesting there were non-state agents 
responsible for the spread of Islam in these places contrary to current beliefs about 
Islam being spread through forced conversions by the rulers. In the case of Bengal a 
split in the course of the river Ganga in the 17th century into what are now the Hugli 
that flows into West Bengal and the Padma into Bangladesh had social 
repercussions. The eastern and older part of the delta, now west Bengal was already 
Hinduized while the portion of the province now served by the Padma was largely 
forested and the communities there were still had animist beliefs some of which 
persist till today (Jalais 2011). The Mughals who were keen to settle this area as it 
had turned into a fertile region due to silting by the Padma gave land grants to 
Muslim ‘pioneers’ some of who were Sufis settled eastern Bengal and gradually 
converted the communities there into Islam (Eaton 2009). In Sind as the various 
tribes of the region settled in irrigated areas around the river Indus the Pirs or holy 
men from various Sufi orders emerged as arbiters in fights between the tribes 
gradually increasing their own power and driving the adoption of Islam. In Punjab 
the Hindu nomadic Jat tribes would come into contact with urban residents around 
the Sufi shrines and once the Jats adopted settled cultivation they gradually adopted 
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an Islamic identity focused around the shrine (Eaton 2009).  Hence the areas with 
the largest numbers of Muslims, eastern Bengal, western Punjab, Sind, NWFP and 
Baluchistan were not strictly within the folds of caste-bound Brahmanical Hinduism 
around the times we are referring to. The idea of conversion in Islam only became 
popular around the 19th century CE when British scholars were trying to cast the 
spread of Islam in South Asia in the mould of what Christian missionaries were doing 
in European colonies.  
The rest of the section will not delve further into Islamic rule in India once it was 
established because that does not contribute directly to events surrounding 
partition. What only needs to be mentioned about the initial period of British rule, as 
early as in the first few decades of the East India Company was the beginnings of the 
creation of a historiography of Hinduism that necessarily cast Muslims as ‘foreign’ in 
India  (Chatterjee 1991).  The history that we outline is certainly not the version of 
history of partition as it is popularly understood in the sub-continent and indeed 
elsewhere in the Western world which is of a fatal clash of opposing cultures. The 
reason we outline is more materialist with culture once again being instrumentalized 
for mobilization and the roots of the conflict between sections of the Hindu and 
Muslim community in South Asia lie with the advent of electoral reforms in British 
India and the creation of separate electorates (Reed 1930; Hasan 2001; Woods 
2007). This was a period of significant constitutional reform by the British and 
League and Congress strategies around this time focused heavily on their responses 
to these attempts at reform, essentially to the various strategies of power sharing 
that the British were trying to implement. The decisive stage in the creation of 
Pakistan and India begins from 1909 with the introduction of the Morley Minto 
reforms or the Indian Councils Act. For the first time this Act allowed election of 
Indian members to the Legislative Councils at both the centre and the provinces. 
Following this were the Montagu Chelmsford reforms in 1919 which started the 
system of dyarchy in India and allowed for relatively significant autonomy to the 
provinces. This Act shifted the theatre of Hindu-Muslim representation to the 
provinces, especially Punjab and was no longer concerned with power sharing in 
Delhi (Jalal and Seal 1981). The Government of India Act in 1935 provided for 
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significant autonomy to existing provinces and resulted in the creation of separate 
provinces, most significantly the creation of Sindh from Bombay Presidency. The 
proportion of franchise through direct elections also increased under this Act. Some 
have also credited the Act with bringing about the origins of ‘patronage politics’  in 
the sub-continent as elected ministers started jockeying for power (Alavi 1983b). 
Interestingly the League was still not a force to reckon when elections were held 
under the new Act in 1937, just a decade before partition. The Congress had 
majorities in seven provinces and the Muslim majority provinces of Punjab and 
Bengal had non-League governments, though in Bengal it was in coalition with Fazlul 
Haq’s middle class peasant dominated Krishok Proja Party and in Punjab the Fazl-I-
Husain’s Unionist Party was in power. Both these parties though Muslim dominated 
were an alliance of class interests—upper class land owning in Punjab and middle 
peasant in Bengal. The irony of this contradiction makes for interesting academic 
pursuit but is beyond the scope of this paper. By 1946 matters changed completely 
in both these provinces.   
In the interim British India witnessed its most tumultuous decade. While defending 
itself against the Axis powers in the World war the British were also trying to 
hammer out an Indian constitution best suited to the many diverging interests in 
India. To this end it organized three Round Table Conferences, set up the Communal 
Awards (which provided for separate electoral constituencies for minorities) and 
finally the Cabinet mission in 1946. The history of this period perhaps remains one of 
the most widely researched periods in colonial history and this paper will not 
attempt to reproduce it here. But between these years the League grew in 
popularity with the Muslims under Jinnah who was now able to legitimately claim 
that he spoke for Muslims given the Congress’ general recalcitrance with issues of 
representation (Brown 1947; Noorani 1979; Jalal and Seal 1981; Jalal 1990). Most 
level headed historical accounts of this period of history portray Jinnah as an astute 
leader who dangled Pakistan as a bargaining counter for securing legitimate Muslim 
rights (Jalal 1985; Hasan 2001). For one certainly for a majority of his political life 
Jinnah disagreed, with Gandhi’s strategy of mixing religion with politics.  It is of 
course also well documented that Jinnah agreed with the one last effort the British 
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put in to ensure an undivided India, the Cabinet Mission (Jalal 1985; Hasan 1993; A. 
Roy 1993; Anderson 2012). The Cabinet Mission rejected the idea of a sovereign 
Pakistan and divided the 11 British ruled Indian provinces into three ‘sections’ which 
could later if they wished from into three ‘groups’. The centre would only oversee 
foreign affairs, defence, communication and finance for the three groups and 
substantial local autonomy was left to the sections. Provinces were allowed to 
secede from the Groups but not the Indian union. The three sections were the Hindu 
majority provinces that make up much of modern India today, the Muslim majority 
provinces of the north west (Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, NWFP) and the Muslim 
majority provinces of the east (Bengal and Assam though Assam had a sizable not 
majority Muslim population). Yet this was rejected by the Congress and Nehru who 
felt only a strong ‘centre’ ruled by the Congress was in India’s interests (Noorani 
1979; A. Roy 1993). 
What partition does demonstrate is how important the creation of demography is 
once a western style representative democracy is introduced in developing 
countries. Historians of partition have consistently demonstrated how electoral 
mobilisations based on demography in Punjab, Sindh and Bengal allowed for 
successful cleavages to take shape (Chatterji 1995; Gilmartin 2001; L. A. Gordon 
2001; Talbot 2005). In the case of Sindh and Punjab it was mobilisation by Muslim 
landowners and pirs (holy men) respectively that helped the League’s cause in 1947. 
In undivided Bengal under the British (the eastern part of the province became first 
East Pakistan and then won independence for itself as Bangladesh) conversely it was 
the upper caste Hindus who mobilised for partition (Chatterji 1995; M. H. Khan 
2010). As Khan describes it in the case of Bengal the shift towards a religion based 
identity or communal one was essentially a ‘crisis of exclusion’ where the 
economically and politically powerful but minority in terms of population Hindu elite 
were threatened by the increasing political mobilisation of a rising Muslim 
intermediate class. The issue at hand was who would rule Bengal’s provincial 
assembly and wield power. Matters were very different in 1905 when Muslim-Hindu 
unity in Bengal was seen as exemplary. It was a successful combination of Muslims 
and Hindus that opposed an initial administrative partition of Bengal in 1905, a 
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feature of imperialist Britain’s famous ‘divide and rule’ policy. What changed from 
then to 1947 was the introduction of limited suffrage and separate electorates 
(where Muslims would vote only for Muslims) and the resulting emergence of a 
specific patron-client political settlement (M. H. Khan 2010). Elections required the 
competing groupings of Hindu elites on one side and the intermediate class of the 
Muslim peasantry on the other to wield organizational power and this was done 
through patron-client politics. As we have mentioned in Chapter Three developing 
countries whether democracies, single party or with authoritarian regimes can have 
competing patron-client groupings. This is an almost universal feature of developing 
countries and their presence can be linked to their low levels of economic growth. 
Redistribution is then achieved through informal means that is often called 
patronage politics as a pejorative but is a structural feature of developing countries, 
and not cultural.  
In the end a combination of the impatient British, expedient Congress and 
precipitate League ensured the rejection of further attempts to forge an Indian 
federation and finally resulted in partition and independence in 1947. The irony was 
that a third of British India’s Muslim population lay outside the new ‘Muslim nation’–
a mockery of the two nation theory. It was impossible for the sizable Muslim 
population within the Hindu majority provinces to make the move to Pakistan even if 
they wanted to. This made it possible for the Congress to cast the League action 
almost as an act of secession (Jalal 1995a) and it is this (mis)interpretation that sticks 
to the sub-continent to this day. 
7.4 The First Three Decades: From Industrial Policy to ‘Islamization’ 
The first serious blow to independent Pakistan occurred in 1948 with the death of 
Jinnah.  By 1951 its first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali was mysteriously assassinated.  
However through this political turmoil Pakistan pursued aggressive policies of 
industrialization in the first two decades of its independence. In the 1960s it actively 
encouraged capitalists willing to invest in industry by subsidizing their learning 
through bearing the start-up risk. This proved to be successful with Pakistan’s 
26 
 
manufacturing growth rate outpacing India’s. While there have been arguments that 
Pakistan was building from a very low base its gains in the manufacturing sector 
cannot just be explained away by the base effect as we will see in later sections. 
Here Pakistan’s attempts at industrial development were different from India’s 
dirigiste economy in that it encouraged private sector participation and the state 
remained as the risk bearer in the initial stages, an institutional innovation not often 
seen in developing countries (M. H. Khan 1999). It was during the 1970s and 1980s 
that Pakistan had developed two export oriented industries, a viable cotton textile 
industry and a highly successful surgical instruments industry. In fact right till the 
1980s India’s GDP growth trend was lagging behind Pakistan. However neither of the 
strategies for industrial development used by the two countries led to the desired 
growth effects.  
On the political front in Pakistan the military stepped in to bolster the flagging 
strength of Pakistan’s political parties. The League in both East and West Pakistan 
lost its popularity and came to be replaced by a United Front government in East 
Pakistan and by political parties like the Republican Party in West Pakistan. By the 
time Ayub Khan’s coup took place in 1958 the civil-military complex was already 
quite strong in Pakistan. Also in place was an anti-Indian rhetoric that was based on 
the interpretation of having seceded from ‘Hindu’ India as mentioned in the Section 
7.2. This meant any show of opposition to the centre was immediately marked off as 
anti-national and even pro-Indian (Talbot 2005).  
A lot has been written about Pakistan’s early years of industrial development (S. H. 
Gordon 1954; Papanek 1967; Sayeed 1995; Zaidi 1999; M. L. Ali, et al. 2003; 
Robinson 2010; National Institute of Statistics 2012) and the country was quickly 
able to achieve a trade surplus due to an overvalued exchange rate during the 
commodities boom of the Korean War in the 1950s. As Noman points out this 
created enough wealth for many of the country’s trading class who now also had 
surplus to invest in industry when the boom from the Korean War petered away 
(Noman 1991). In the 1950s manufacturing became the leading sector in Pakistan 
growing at 8 per cent per year (Burki 1981). However more important than these 
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growth rates were three important institutions that were set up by the government 
in this period the Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation (PICIC), the 
Pakistan Industrial Finance Corporation (PIFCO) and the Pakistan Industrial 
Development Corporation (PIDC). These institutions were innovations at the time as 
they acted as risk financiers for manufacturing though their effect on increasing 
inequality is now a matter of debate within Pakistan. The PIDC was the lead 
organization and served as a financial institution that funded learning as it made the 
initial investments in areas the private sector did not immediately see returns in 
before selling these enterprises to entrepreneurs (M. H. Khan 1999). As we have 
discussed in chapter two of this paper entrepreneurs in developing countries often 
fail to invest in critical industries due to the risk imposed by high entry costs and late 
profitability. With PIDC bearing this initial risk entrepreneurs could then be bought in 
at a stage which was relatively more within their capabilities or more importantly 
aligned with their appetite for risk. The declining terms of trade for agriculture also 
meant that the agriculture driven economy of East Pakistan suffered more due to 
the strategy of ISI, contributing to the perception of marginalization in that province 
that would reach its climax in the creation of Bangladesh (Power 1963; 
Maniruzzaman 1971; M. H. Khan 1999). At the end of this period the army emerged 
in a moderate operational equilibrium with the civil bureaucracy. The two together 
used their concert to start a process of institution building that was compatible with 
the newly emerged political settlement. 
The period of General Ayub Khan’s tenure (1958 to 1969) has been well documented 
in literature on Pakistan (H. Gardezi 1971; Alavi 1976; Burki 1981; M. H. Khan 1999; I. 
Ali 2002). Muhamad Ayub Khan rose to prominence when he was appointed 
commander-in-chief by Liaquat Khan in 1951 and he took over power in a coup in 
1958. Burki suggests that the army was able to step in because a conflict between 
the landed indigenous elite and the migrant politicians created a situation where the 
army could strengthen its own position (Burki 1980). Ayub's rule is marked by two 
significant milestones namely the attempt to establish democracy directly bypassing 
political organizations in rural Pakistan through ‘Basic Democracy’ and high levels of 
industrial and economic growth that was achieved by first through PIDC’s policies 
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and then by discretionary allotments to selected capitalists. These had consequences 
that helped explain the political settlement towards the end of Ayub’s reign, namely 
the explosion of secessionist dissent in East Pakistan and even in West Pakistan 
significant political opposition to him that saw the rise of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. In terms 
of our framework this phase can be characterized as military authoritarianism in a 
moderate operational equilibrium with vulnerable patrimonialism. What resulted 
was a mismatch between the distribution of benefits among the army and the 
coalitions it built up and the distribution of power among the excluded 
organizations. Pakistan’s urban population grew from 17 percent in 1951 to 22.5 
percent in 1961 with a three-fold increase in the number of industrial workers. It is 
no surprise that opposition to the Ayub regime was the strongest in growing urban 
centres (Jalal 1990; Sayeed 1995). For one his strategies did not even work in West 
Pakistan but it was even more unsuited for the east. Bengal, even as an undivided 
province in British India was known for its high levels of political mobilization and 
sensitization (Sayeed 1995). The secession of Bangladesh from united Pakistan can 
be best described as the exclusion of the East Bengali elites from the Punjabi and 
Mohajir (Muslim migrants from India to Pakistan) controlled political.  
The issue in East Pakistan however was not as simple as an upsurge in latent 
nationalist sentiments fuelled by an almost colonial attitude of ‘Punjabi’ West 
Pakistan (M. H. Khan 2010). At least in the 1950s there was a genuine attempt by 
both wings of the country to make the arrangement work with many Bengali 
politicians in leadership roles nationally and there was no groundswell of support for 
independence even till the mid 1960s (M. H. Khan 2010). In the best south Asian 
tradition though mainstream Bangladeshi discourse excises this historical fact and 
concentrates only on the ‘War of Liberation. For sure the terms of trade being 
against agriculture and the overvalued exchange rate did affect the agriculturally 
better endowed East Pakistan (rice, jute) in the 1950s. Levels of investment were 
also higher in the western wing than in the east but as Talbot, Khan and Jaffrelot 
have shown towards the end of the 1960s investments were actually on the rise in 
East Pakistan (M. H. Khan 1999; Jaffrelot 2002; Talbot 2005). By the time popular 
resentment in both West and East Pakistan forced Ayub Khan to leave office in 
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favour of General Yahya Khan in 1969 there were other catalysts would eventually 
lead to the formation on Bangladesh after a decisive and opportunistic Indian 
military intervention in 1971. This was basically the fact that Bhutto and the PPP 
were vehemently opposed to Mujib-ur-Rahman becoming Prime Minister of Pakistan 
even after he won a majority in the elections of 1970. 
GDP 4.2 
Agriculture 2.1 
Industry 5 
Manufacturing 3.4 
Services 6.6 
 
Table 7.3.  Sectoral and GDP growth rates 1971-77 (constant US$2000) 
Source: WDI, World Bank 
 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto came to power in tumultuous times but he had the support of the 
West Pakistani elite who despite being a minority were loathe to lose economic and 
political power to East Pakistan. Despite presiding over the dismemberment of the 
country Bhutto’s early years were characterized by a high level of support for him. 
The first reason for this was that the army was still recovering from its loss against 
India and still too weak. The second reason was Bhutto’s early recognition of the fact 
that patronage based politics was necessary to ensure his survival. To this end 
Bhutto diluted the strength of Pakistan’s highly capable bureaucracy by firing 1300 
civil servants in 1972 who had incidentally entered the civil service through the 
tightly regulated Civil Service of Pakistan, a holdover from the British times mirroring 
the similar Indian Administrative Service. This was done in order to facilitate lateral 
entry for important members of the PPP and supporters of the regime in return for 
their support. The other key feature of Bhutto’s redistributive politics was the 
nationalization of some industries, the financial and education sectors. However he 
alienated a large section of small-scale industrialists and traders by nationalizing 
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three semi- cottage industries of rice milling, cotton milling and ghee (clarified 
butter) production (Sayeed 1995).   
Bhutto identified his policies as ‘Islamic Socialism’, a sort of catch-all phrase that he 
tried to supplement with populist, redistributive policies. But his explicit use of Islam, 
the first time since independence was essentially a cover for an authoritarian one-
party rule. His policies could not deliver the broad based growth that Pakistan so 
desperately needed precisely because apart from a few populist measures most of 
the regime’s energies were concentrated on building a combination of clientelist 
support that it thought would ensure support. GDP growth stalled to 4 percent and 
manufacturing was the worst performing sector (Table 7.3). His populist economic 
policies had succeeded in slowing down the Pakistani economy though some 
economists like Zaidi and Hamid contend that some of the growth in Zia’s tenure 
occurred as projects sanctioned under Bhutto came on stream later and that the 
small scale industry sector actually did better under Bhutto (Hamid 1992; Zaidi 
1999). However the clientelist political settlement can veer damagingly towards high 
levels of fragmentation and contestation with patrons unable to enforce order over 
their various factions if economic growth is low and therefore the opportunity for 
payoffs is low. The operational equilibrium under Bhutto proved too tenuous with 
just the rural voter base on his side and once again popular protests laid the ground 
for Zia-ul-Haq’s coup. What added to the collapse of the political settlement in this 
period was also the growing strength of the army that Bhutto had to depend on to 
quell uprisings in Baluchistan. The political settlement under Bhutto can be 
described as authoritarian clientelism in an operational equilibrium with constrained 
patrimonialism. 
GDP 6.6 
Agriculture 3.9 
Industry 8 
Manufacturing 8.8 
Services 7 
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Table 7.4. Sectoral and GDP growth rates 1977-88 (constant US$2000) 
Source: WDI, World Bank 
 
 This brought Zia-ul-Haq into power with a coup in 1977 and he ruled Pakistan till his 
assassination in 1988. Enough has been said about Zia-ul-Haq and his rule and its 
import for Pakistan (Burki 1981; Noman 1991; Jalal 1995b; Alavi 1998; Zaidi 1999; 
Talbot 2005). Hence this section won’t attempt a lengthy exposition of the details of 
Zia’s regime but only pick out and analyze the most consequential aspects. All agree 
that Zia’s regime turned out to be the one that firmly linked Pakistan to the Cold War 
anti-Soviet Union global geo-political discourse. His regime is also known for 
repression of civil liberties and using Islam as an ideology to foster national unity in 
the face of Soviet presence in Afghanistan as well as heightened political 
mobilization within Pakistan. Yet the Pakistani economy grew at a rate averaging 
over six percent in these years.  Zia did not start out as an ally of the US. It was only 
with the Regan administration’s involvement in aiding the Mujahideen forces in 
Afghanistan that Pakistan occupied a frontline position in the US’ anti Soviet 
strategy.  
Pakistan’s growth in the Zia years was not linked to an expansion of its 
manufacturing sector. The economy grew due to a rise in the proportion of foreign 
aid, especially military aid that flowed into country because of its involvement in 
Afghanistan, and the increasing remittances from Pakistani citizens working in the 
Middle Eastern countries as the Pakistani political economy became more linked to 
the Middle East, especially as a result of its attempts to institutionalize Islam within 
the state. Between 1978 and 1986 skilled Pakistani workers sent home as much as 
$25 billion in remittances (Burki and Naseem 1996). A reversal of some of Bhutto’s 
nationalization policies also followed but remittances and aid were the main reasons 
for Pakistan’s growth in this period (Table 7.4). Aid of course added to the GDP 
numbers and the remittances helped spawn a middle class larger than was seen in 
the previous decades (Burki 1981; Zaidi 1999; Talbot 2005). The rise of this middle 
class led to the development of a few sophisticated industrial clusters around 
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Faisalabad and Sialkot that sustain till today, though in the face of increasing costs 
and decreases in productivity, the reasons for which will be discussed later. The 
cotton textile sector also did well but could not move beyond low value added 
manufacturing. While a re-privatization was not carried especially in the insurance 
sectors barriers to entry for private enterprise were quickly dropped and this helped 
small entrepreneurs and growth picked up once again (Sayeed 1995; Zaidi 1999). 
However lack of appropriate policy instruments to aid this entrepreneurial base led 
to increasing informality in the Pakistani economy from this time. This period did see 
the emergence of a new type of capitalists but they very different from those during 
Ayub’s tenure. These capitalists had political ambitions and were more closely 
meshed into patron-client structures of Pakistani politics. They included families like 
the Lakhanis, Sharifs and, Hashwanis who made their money through newly 
deregulated sectors like cement, oil seeds, and fertilizers (Sayeed 1995). However 
the growth they produced can best be described as what Khan defines as primitive 
accumulation or growth through off market (informal) activities like land grabs, 
resource capture or extortions (M. H. Khan 2002, 2012b) without providing any 
positive feedbacks into the formal economy through productivity and employment 
led growth. The Sharifs are of course the most well known with the family now 
becoming one of South Asia’s leading political dynasties through the Pakistan Muslim 
League (Nawaz) or PML (N). 
Towards the end of his tenure Zia had began to distance himself from the more 
obscurantist demands of the Ulema but by then the country was already deeply 
divided on sectarian lines (Talbot 2005). Like Ayub, Zia missed an opportunity to 
discipline the capitalists his regime created because his focus remained foreign 
policy. More importantly the rise of the middle class could have provided credibility 
to targeted industrial policy instruments had they been introduced and 
implemented. The political settlement that evolved in the Zia era, a long 11 years 
was one where the army became the organization superior over all others. The army 
was also increasing its role in directing the economy and even taking part in 
production. Formal political organizations (electoral parties) were kept under severe 
repression. And informal organizations, especially of small businesses and religious 
33 
 
organizations were created for the army to gain legitimacy at a time when political 
freedom was suppressed. The bureaucracy existed as a concerted civil bureaucracy 
in a strong operational equilibrium with the military. It is impossible to answer 
where Pakistan might have headed had Zia not been assassinated. However the 
levels of repression and exclusion in the political settlement would likely have made 
it unsustainable. 
7.5 Democracy, moves towards Liberalization and a return to Military Rule 
 
GDP 4 
Agriculture 4.3 
Industry 4.5 
Manufacturing 4.0 
Services 4.3 
 
Table 7.5. Sectoral and GDP growth rates 1988-99 (constant US$2000) 
Source: WDI, World Development Report 
 
General Zia’s untimely death provided Pakistan’s leaders with an opportunity to 
break with the past and in a sense the military establishment did so by refraining 
from continuing with army-led rule. Elections were held in 1988 and the PPP under 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s daughter Benazir Bhutto won a majority enough to form a 
civilian government. There were high expectations from Benazir, but this was to be 
no transformational move that changed the political structure of Pakistan in any 
permanent manner but a transitional one where only the seat of formal power 
changed. Informally the army still retained effective power. Once again this section 
will only highlight the significant events that were to affect the political settlement at 
this time. Talbot (2005) provides a detailed exposition of this period for those 
interested. It was Benazir’s attempts at toeing a line independent of the army and 
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the powerful president Ghulam Ishaq Khan that cost her prime ministership in 1990. 
However her own autocratic style, inability to break the stranglehold of large 
landlords, appropriation of state resources for private use, especially deals 
concerning her husband Asif Ali Zardari, later to be Pakistan’s president and an 
inability to direct economic growth provided the Army with enough rationale to 
dismiss her. Increasing confrontations with the powerful Islami Jamhoori Ijtehad (IJI) 
of which Nawaz Sharif was the main leader were debilitating but more critically the 
PPP’s failure to come to any compromise with the Muttahida Quami Movement or 
MQM in Sindh meant the province, especially Karachi the economic hub of the 
country was rocked by violence throughout her tenure. The MQM was founded in 
1974 to represent the rights of Urdu speaking migrants from British India and has 
remained a political organization in Sind with significant holding power that the 
party uses to mobilize its supporters, sometimes violently when it feels a threat to its 
existence. 
Nawaz Sharif came to power after elections in 1990 and despite being close to the 
Army as well as having his power base in the influential Punjab province he found it 
difficult to run the government given the mistrust between the political 
organizations and the army. The legacies of Zia’s Islamic mobilization were also 
bearing down heavier on him because his ruling alliance the IJI included parties like 
the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) that wanted to press ahead with their agenda of Islamization. 
He survived in power for three years because he was a cannier politician than 
Benazir having been chief minister of Punjab earlier and helping his father build their 
industrial empire during the Zia regime (Talbot 2005). Yet Sharif’s downfall was 
exacerbated by his anti-Saddam policies when the Pakistani sentiment was anti US 
and pro-Saddam. More importantly the army was also displeased with Sharif for 
taking Pakistan US relations to one of its lowest ebbs as a result of some Chinese 
arms procurements. Perhaps the greatest shortcoming was the absence of any live 
and let live politics between the PML (N) and the PPP on the lines of those achieved 
by the Dravidian parties in Tamil Nadu. If the two parties had come together to 
oppose the army and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan at this time at this time civilian 
rule might have been strengthened in the country. However the intense clientelistic 
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competition between the two main parties made political stability a casualty in 
Pakistan. On the economic front Sharif’s first term largely saw a policy of economic 
liberalization. By the October of 1990 as many as 89 state enterprises were up for 
sale and controls on inflow of foreign currency were removed in an effort to attract 
foreign investment. The Sharif government was accused of misappropriation of 
public funds in cooperative societies which led to ordinary depositors losing Rs 20 
billion. In 1993 a caretaker government was sworn after the President Ishaq Khan 
dismissed the Sharif government, once again because the president and the prime 
minister were at loggerheads. Moeen Qureshi, a former vice president of the World 
Bank was brought in to head the caretaker government. This feature of caretaker 
governments in Pakistan being headed by political outsiders will be discussed later in 
the section. 
Benazir was reelected in the elections of 1993 but like with the two elected 
governments before decisive power remained with the army and president. But the 
most singular problem in her second term before she was dismissed again in 1996 
was the civil war like situation in Karachi as pitched battles were fought between the 
MQM(A) or the Altaf Hussain faction of the MQM and the army with the PPP 
government being unable to stem the violence. However incessant counter 
insurgency tactics ensured the violence at least died down. However, Talbot argues 
that this also ensured Pakistani society still remained deeply divided. It is not as if 
the violence in Karachi was the only issue that plagued the second PPP government. 
The needs to implement IMF imposed austerity and the realities of keeping the 
military on her side ended up with the party alienating organized labour, a key PPP 
support base. Labour was hit by privatizations under austerity and on the other hand 
her own party functionaries uncomfortable with ex-military officials being appointed 
as governors of provinces (Talbot 2005). The PPP victory also had an adverse impact 
on sectarian conflicts rather than quelling them. As our framework suggests 
powerful organizations that do not accept the legitimacy of an election result will 
contest it to achieve a distribution of benefits and authority that reflect what they 
believe is the true distribution of power. In this case organizations like the Tehrik-e-
Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM, a breakaway group from the Jamaat-e-Islami) 
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were fighting the Pakistani army for the implementation of the Sharia in the 
Malakand region of Khyberpakhtunkhwa, a fallout of the strategy of aiding the 
Afghan Taliban (Talbot 2005). Contrary to popular knowledge Pakistan was already 
fighting its own citizens who wanted a society based on exclusively Islamic tenets as 
long ago as 1992. By the mid 1990s the Pakistani state was trying to balance two 
similar forces but opposing strategies (Hasnat 2009). On the back of these 
developments ambitious efforts were made to bring down the budget deficit to 4.5 
percent of the GDP in line with IMF requirements. Her budget of 1996 proved to be 
highly unpopular as an already beleaguered middle and lower class were saddled 
with higher costs of living. Benazir agreed to further tax increases to receive the third 
tranche of a standby which the IMF was refusing to release. This proved politically 
unsellable and violent anti budget demonstrations followed spearheaded by the 
transport sector, doctors, booksellers and newspapers vendors going on strike 
(LaPorte 1997).  Political recriminations between Benazir and president Leghari acted 
as the catalyst in the dismissal of her government.  
Nawaz Sharif and the PML (N) were voted back in the elections of 1996 with the JI 
refusing to take part. The JI boycotted the elections at this time because it felt the 
voter lists and constituencies need to be redrawn and did not reflect changes in 
population. In reality the JI was unable to match the patron-client politics, especially 
the biradri based politics of the two main clientelist parties (PPP and PML) and hence 
would have been unable to compete electorally with them. This is still one of the 
reasons why the JI hasn’t become a formidable electoral force in Pakistan. (However 
after elections held this year the JI has entered into a coalition to run the provincial 
government in Khyberpakhtunkhwa with Pakistan’s emerging opposition party 
Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaaf though it itself has a share of only nine seats). By this time 
Pakistan’s debt levels meant every Pakistani carried a liability of $500 (Talbot 2005). 
Given the increasing politicization of the bureaucracy and Sharif’s attempts at 
deliberately weakening the judiciary the Army was called in to perform routine 
administrative tasks. This only made the Army stronger and better able to check 
Sharif’s growing bent toward authoritarianism (Talbot 2005).  
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But the real import of Sharif’s animosity towards the Army was its consequences for 
the economy. The Pakistani economy saw a dip in the GDP growth rate from the 
levels of the Zia years, from 6.6 to 4 per cent (Table 7.5). The PML(N) at one point 
seemed to be political organization most suited to develop capabilities among 
Pakistan’s indigenous businessmen (Lieven 2011) . It was created by the Army, 
specifically Zia, and the Sharifs and similar families were successful businessmen 
with the correct kinship networks. This would have helped the Army overcome 
difficulties arising out of picking ‘winners’ and hence solve the problem of lack of 
legitimacy that so often confronts states pushing an industrial agenda that favours 
some over others. As we have mentioned before one of the reasons for the failure of 
Ayub Khan’s attempts at implementing industrial policy was an inability to choose 
capitalists who could also claim legitimacy from Pakistan’s other social classes. By 
the time Sharif came to power the Pakistani middle class had also evolved enough to 
demand the benefits of further industrialization.  The party was also in alliance with 
the JI and the latter’s popularity among those sections of the country who are both 
conservative and lower middle class and newly emerging middle class would have 
provided the PML (N) with the added legitimacy it lacks now, especially with Islamic 
organizations mobilizing much more intensely in contemporary Pakistan and not 
always for economic redistribution.  
Another advantage was that the PML (N)’s stronghold is in Punjab, Pakistan’s 
industrial heart which includes industrial centres like Faisalabad (in the Saraiki 
speaking region) and Sialkot (near Lahore). The Saraiki speaking regions can 
sometimes be at odds with the Punjabi speaking regions but Sharif was still able to 
carry his party through in the Saraiki regions. However Sharif took the Army head on 
and at this time General Pervez Musharraf ensured Sharif’s wings were effectively 
clipped. This prevented any repetition of a military-political-capitalist alliance 
reminiscent of Ayub’s times. Along with the efforts of the Ayub era and Zia’s missed 
opportunity the Sharif administration’s second tenure can also be seen as a phase 
that showed the highest potential for implementing an industrial policy, but the 
opportunity soon dissipated in part due to Sharif’s own political recalcitrance. As 
Lieven points this is one of the key reasons why Pakistan will not see a replication of 
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even the modest growth in Egypt and Iran which was achieved through the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s support base of a relatively prosperous commercial class or in Iran’s 
case through the Bazaaris. The Bazaaris are Iran’s heterogeneous commercial class 
who were neglected by the Shah but were mobilized effectively by leaders of the 
Revolution especially through their networks in mosques located in urban trading 
centres. Some Bazaari leaders were subsequently given positions of power in the 
government. A Turkish ‘model’ seems almost an impossibility given that the ruling 
AKP has its support base directly among the Anatolian capitalists who were 
neglected by the Army regimes in Istanbul. This gives the AKP credibility among a 
sizable section of capitalists in the country. More importantly the per capita incomes 
of all these countries are higher than Pakistan’s, especially Turkey, and the classes 
mobilized could utilize their relative economic prosperity to move towards a more 
successful transition to a broad-based capitalism. It would be difficult for the JI to 
drive such a transformation in Pakistan because there is little investible surplus 
among its aspirational but lower middle class support base who could mobilize to 
drive growth. The JI has strong views about social justice based on its Islamic world 
view but would have little to deliver on formal economic policy (Lieven 2011). Yet it 
is interesting that the widespread lawyer’s movement in Pakistan that proved to be 
General Musharraf’s undoing found strong support with the JI. Hence attempts at 
policy making would do well to involve the JI even though its presence in the 
National Assembly of Pakistan is very low.  
The interregnum between the PPP government and the PML (N) government in 1993 
saw a caretaker government in power headed by a former vice president of the 
World Bank (there was another headed by Balakh Khan Mazari but achieved little in 
terms of the economy). While this might not seem out of place now, what with 
African leaders frequently having World Bank careers behind them, in 1993, and 
certainly for South Asia, this was a first. Other senior ministers in the Moeen Qureshi 
government were also more businessmen than politicians: the finance minister was 
a leading industrialist while the information minister was the head of IBM in Pakistan. 
For a country whose organized sector was pitifully small and which was still caught 
up in a transition from a proto-capitalist to a broad-based productive capitalism this 
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was a technocratic government that in no way represented the true social, political 
or economic structure of the country. However both Benazir and Sharif acquiesced 
to this choice largely because it meant unpopular reforms could be carried through 
without the popular politicians taking the blame. The Army also backed Qureshi as a 
means to introduce austerity based reforms. Pakistan had already received its first 
structural adjustment loan in 1982 under Zia but the military government had 
cancelled it perhaps anticipating the protests that later such programmes would lead 
to. Military expenditure was one of the key reasons why Pakistan’s foreign debt 
liabilities reached close to $19 billion in 1990-91. By 2008 this had gone up to 
unsustainable levels of $44 billion (Mahmood Tahir 2009). In 1996 the second 
caretaker government of Meraj Khalid stepped in between Benazir’s and Sharif’s 
second term. This included Shahid Javed Burki, a World Bank vice president as the 
country’s chief economic advisor. Once again in line with IMF requirements Burki 
tried to introduce reforms like taxing agriculture, privatization, rationalizing 
petroleum prices etc.  
The political settlement of the democratic period reflected a competitive clientelist 
distribution of power across political organizations. The ruling coalition, whether 
PML-N or PPP was weak, and lacked long time horizons and implementation 
capabilities. Technocrats supported by the army and with the tacit approval of the 
political and business leadership pushed through early liberalization reforms. There 
was little evidence of significant resistance from big business which suggests that the 
hidden subsidies and benefits were informally continued. However, subsidies to 
social sectors began to be cut, reflecting the weak incorporation of intermediate 
class interests in the ruling political organizations. While this was happening, the 
capture of significant resources by economic and political organizations higher up 
the political hierarchy intensified. The evidence and charges of political corruption 
increased as a result of heightened primitive accumulation involving elites in both 
parties. The partial implementation of liberalization reflects the distribution of 
power in the political settlement with adverse effects for long-term growth and 
political stability.  Much of the structural adjustment programmes were pushed 
through the institutional mechanism of the caretaker government. The caretaker 
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governments were not answerable to Pakistan’s National assembly, nor were they 
composed of political parties who operated on the basis of any patron-client system 
and they had the tacit support of the army. This freed the technocratic caretaker 
governments of any clientelistic compulsions and the army’s support gave them a 
free hand to announce the reforms. A later section in the chapter deals with the 
adverse consequences of such reform by stealth. 
 
GDP 5 
Agriculture 3.2 
Industry 6.8 
Manufacturing 8.6 
Services 5.7 
 
Table 7.6. Sectoral and GDP growth rates 1999-2008 (constant US$2000) 
Source: WDI, World Bank 
 
 
The government of General Pervez Musharraf that followed was dominated by 
security issues and security-related rents. Musharraf is likely to be remembered for 
two key issues–the brief and rash Kargil War with India and the decision to take on 
the Taliban in earnest (though Pakistan had started initial crackdowns on Islamist 
organizations as early as 1992) at the behest of the Americans after 9/11 including 
sending the Army into vulnerable areas like the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in Lahore. 
The regime’s imperatives of charting out a strategy that would allow it to balance 
between the need to be an American ally and using the Taliban to create strategic 
anti-India depth placed Musharraf between a rock and hard place. Like Ayub and Zia, 
when faced with growing civil and political unrest he fell back on local municipal 
elections in 2000 to bypass the clientelist political parties and co-opt new political 
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organizers at lower levels (Talbot 2005; Lieven 2011). In 2002 Musharraf created a 
party mostly of defectors from the PML (N) called the PML (Qaid e Azam) or PML (Q). 
As Lieven says Musharraf was genuinely committed as a liberal progressive but once 
again ran into the realities of South Asia’s complex social structures and patron-
client politics. On the economic front his high profile finance minister and later prime 
minister Shaukat Aziz, a former Citibank senior executive steered the economy at a 
time when growth hovered between 6.6 percent and 9 percent (Lieven 2011). His 
policies once again veered close to Qureshi’s and Burki’s, essentially privatization 
and deregulation. For a while his policies seemed to have worked and enhanced yet 
military aid was once again responsible for higher growth rates (Table 7.6). It was 3.9 
per cent when Musharraf took over in 1998 (Lieven 2011). In certain consumer 
driven sectors like mobile telephony and internet usage these policies worked well. 
The number of mobile phone subscribers rose from 300,000 in 1997 to 35 million in 
2007. Internet users went from 200,000 to 2.4 million in the same period. Even 
exports did well increasing from $7.5 billion in 1998-99 to $17 billion in 2006-07 
(Shaukat Aziz in an interview in Emerging Jordan) (Oxford 2007). However as Lieven 
recounts businessmen in key industrial centres like Faisalabad felt the growth targets 
of Aziz (phones, fridges, net connections) were misplaced when what the country 
needed a comprehensive investment architecture for industrial growth. That was 
simply not provided (Lieven 2011).  
The political settlement under Musharraf approximated to a more vulnerable variant 
of vulnerable patrimonialism. Compared to Zia Musharraf had to exercise greater 
repression to exclude powerful organizations. This ironically led to the weakening of 
the army and its ability to discipline excluded organizations. Moreover, unlike Zia, 
the Afghan adventure that now gave the military access to external rents was this 
time deeply unpopular in many sections of Pakistan’s population. But these strategic 
and rent capture imperatives once again overshadowed a developmental agenda. 
Finally, compared to Zia, Musharraf’s strategy was even less aligned to deliver to 
lower levels of society and the political organizers and organizations at these levels. 
The exclusion of a majority of the intermediate class in areas like the FATA and 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa eventually led to their successful mobilization by informal 
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religious organizations and pushed the country to the brink of civil war. This ensured 
the gains from the early years Musharraf’s tenure could not be consolidated.  
 
 
7.6 Contemporary Pakistan–Deepening of a Crisis of Legitimacy 
GDP 3.8 
Agriculture 2.2 
Industry 4 
Manufacturing .9 
Services 2.2 
 
Table 7.7. Sectoral and GDP growth rates 2008-10 (constant US$2000) 
Source: WDI, World Bank 
 
 
For the first time since independence an elected government completed its five-year 
term in Pakistan 2013. Elections were held in the same with a relatively high turnout 
that returned Nawaz Sharif to power. Importantly the current Army chief of staff 
Ashfaq Parvez Kayani has maintained a studied distance from political developments 
and has passed an order directing senior Army officials to withdraw from civil 
departments, though Pakistani analysts have also suggested the Army is very active 
in the political arena, only not visibly. What this means for an organization long used 
to political power and patronage will be difficult to predict but that this is an 
organization in transition is not in doubt. The PPP is surviving only because those 
planning any possible revolt know that in the tradition of South Asian dynastic 
politics unseating Zardari, now seen as a member of the Bhutto dynasty, will 
destabilize the party as such parties only coalesce around a dynasty. Both the 
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military and political establishment’s complicity in allowing drone attacks that kill 
Pakistani civilians on Pakistani as ‘collateral damage’ soil is ensuring they lose 
credibility in the eyes of ordinary Pakistanis. In all of this the economy has taken a 
back seat. As Lieven recounts businessmen do want the government to provide 
credible direction but do not want what the government is now offering in the way 
of more liberalization (Lieven 2011), and in some cases even the ‘Most Favoured 
Nation’ status to India is being opposed given that India remains the stronger 
economy. The Army’s operations in the north west of the country in the early 2000s 
actually weakened it’s hold over organizations it could once direct. According to the 
International Growth Centre violence in FATA, Balochistan and Khyberpakhtunkhwa 
increased significantly since 2005. Sind and Punjab had historically been witness to 
high levels of political violence but the other three provinces remained relative 
peaceful. It was with Pakistan’s involvement in the so called war on terror that 
violence escalated especially in Khyberpakhtunkhwa. After 2005 the province 
became the second most violence prone province. On the heels of the Army’s 
operation in Swat and Malakand militant attacks in response to the Army’s 
operations increased by 46 times (Shapiro, et al. 2012). This best demonstrates the 
reasons for escalating violence with the Army operations pitting the state against 
organizations that were once part of the ruling coalition. Once again the state 
thought it could manage the choices of including and excluding organizations at will. 
But events proved otherwise with the distribution of power being such that 
organisations like the TPP had the potential to destabilize the country significantly. 
Contrary to beliefs that the Army was the dominant organization arching across 
political, bureaucratic and economic sub-systems a closer analysis through our 
framework suggests otherwise. While there is little doubt that the Army in Pakistan 
pervaded all these three sub-systems was is by no means uncontested. If anything 
contestations by informal political organizations increased in the decade starting in 
2000. The rents that the Army distributed to its clients came under increasing 
contestation by other informal, irregular groups we have identified earlier. Given 
that the Army experienced a crisis of legitimacy due to its support, though strained, 
of US policy and the drone attacks its role as a dominant player is questionable. A 
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spate of attacks on defence personnel in 2013 around the country pointed to the 
fact that the Army no longer had the requisite enforcement capability to direct the 
irregular forces it once employed for strategic purposes.  
Organizational power was embedded within informal religious and quasi religious 
organizations and their sustained exclusion from the US aid-led distribution of 
benefits overseen by the Army is pushing Pakistan towards a consistently weakening 
operational equilibrium. However a distribution of benefits bringing these 
organizations more in line more in line with their real holding power will require 
fundamental, non-incremental changes to the Pakistani political settlement that will 
make the growth stability trade off curve a very steep one. Hence the current 
political settlement where the Army and bureaucratic and business elites share the 
distribution of benefits is unlikely to be changed voluntarily by the latter 
organizations. What we observe therefore is increasing contestations by informal 
Islamic organizations whose demands for pay-offs are becoming increasingly difficult 
to meet as they become more rigid in their interpretation of Islam. This is especially 
evident in attacks on Pakistan’s significant Shia Muslim community. Given the high 
holding power and ability to inflict violence the operational equilibrium between 
them and formal political organizations is understandably very fragile. The Sharif 
government has expressed a desire for rapprochement but continued drone attacks 
have lent little credibility to these efforts. A lack of developmental institutions is 
hampering growth though there are signs of higher private sector involvement with 
a consensus towards more pro-market reforms, especially in the financial sector. As 
a result of this most productive organizations still possess only moderate capability 
and with little formal support developing further capabilities is difficult. As Table 7.7 
shows manufacturing growth was eventually the hardest hit.  
 
7.7 An Evaluation of Liberalization: The Wrong Policy or Poor Implementation? 
Liberalization dominated the institutional and policy reform agenda of Pakistan from 
the 1980s to the 2010s. It was driven by IMF supported Structural Adjustment 
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Programmes (SAPs) that aimed for a combination of austerity and liberalization, 
particularly trade liberalization and privatization. While the growth of GDP and per 
capita incomes both declined in the 1990s they were some improvements in the 
2000s. However inequality increased in both periods though poverty data was on a 
declining trend between 2001-05 (Husain 2010). Total Factor Productivity growth 
was at its lowest from 1990-91 to 2000-01 (Harber 2009). Pakistani economists 
attribute much of the adverse outcomes to Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) 
that Pakistan implemented in this period (Anwar 1996; T. A. Khan 2000; Bhutta 2001; 
H. N. Gardezi 2004; Anwar 2010; Nosheen, et al. 2010; Khan Ali Ejaz Rana 2011). 
There are two types of questions about liberalization in Pakistan during this period. 
The first was whether it was the appropriate policy response to the political and 
economic problems that Pakistan was facing. The second was to understand how the 
programme was likely to be implemented given the weak formal enforcement 
capabilities of the state. Even if the programme had been theoretically appropriate it 
may not have achieved good results in this context. More interestingly, the manner 
of its partial and modified implementation may have had specific adverse effects. 
Pakistan received six tranches of loans under SAPs since the 1980s. A large body of 
literature has evaluated their impact (Redelet S 1998; Naiman and Watkins 1999; 
Baro R. J 2005). The Pakistani criticism of the SAPs suggests that the slowdown and 
growth in economic inequality is at least in part a result of these programmes. Table 
7.8 compares economic growth before and after reforms. The GDP growth rates and 
rate of growth of exports were both higher in the pre reform period. Pakistan 
received approximately $31 billion in IMF loans and other external assistance 
between 1985 and 2000. The most damaging phases of structural reform seem to 
have occurred under the Nawaz Sharif governments. In 1989-90 the government put 
108 of Pakistan’s 175 public service enterprises on sale in industries ranging from 
engineering, oil and gas, telecommunication and fertilizers. At that time their pre-tax 
profit amounted to $ 605 million and their total assets were valued at $ 36.7 billion. 
A ‘fast tracking’ of the process resulted in 66 of these being sold but the proceeds 
yielded only $3.9 billion, far lower than their asset values (T. A. Khan 2000). The 
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private sector only continued to do well in a few sectors like cotton textiles and for 
the most part the growth of the private sector came in the service sector.  
 
Pakistan  Mean BR 
(1980s) 
Median 
BR 
Standard 
Deviation 
BEFORE 
Mean AR 
(1990s-
2007) 
Median 
AR 
Standard 
Deviation 
AR 
Real GDP  
growth rates 
6.7 6.5 1.7 4.8 4.8 2.3 
Investment rate 
(% of GNI) 
18.7 18.8 0.4 18 17.3 1.4 
Current Account 
deficit (% GDP) 
-2.9 -3.3 1.2 -1.3 -2.7 3.7 
Real export 
growth rates 
9.8 12 13.2 7.8 7.6 11.3 
 
Table 7.8. Key economic indicators before and during the reform period 
Note: BR is before reform, AR is after reform. 
Source: (Nosheen, et al. 2010) 
 
Nawaz Sharif also liberalized Pakistan’s stock markets in 1991  As a result the market 
capitalization of the Karachi Stock Exchange increased five times between 1990 and 
1994. Net portfolio inflows into the Pakistani economy amounted to $3.3 billion 
between 1991 and 1995 (I. Ali and Malik 2009). In 1990 the share of total banking 
assets owned by the public financial institutions was 92.2 per cent. By 2009 this 
share had dropped to 18.70 per cent (Waheed 2010). However despite the increase 
in private sector participation and increased financial flows Pakistani banks 
performed less than satisfactorily in terms of extension of credit to the private sector. 
In 2006 Bangladesh had a higher private sector credit to GDP ratio than Pakistan 
despite being the country with lowest per capita incomes in the sub-continent (SBP 
2006) Credit has also not been flowing to sectors like SMEs despite efforts of the 
government (GoP 2011). Pakistan’s GDP growth rates were slightly higher under 
Musharraf, but then declined again  (Table 7.2). 
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Tables 7.5 to 7.7 show that manufacturing had spurts of growth after the process of 
liberalization but by the end of the 2010s the industrial and manufacturing sector in 
Pakistan faced significant challenges. Unlike India and Bangladesh, Pakistan did not 
develop any new globally competitive sectors in the 1980s or 1990s. According to 
some studies economy-level TFP improved in the 1990s but this is largely explained 
by the growth of some high value services like finance, after the liberalization of 
1991 and better capacity utilization of in the 1990s as domestic demand was 
sustained by security-related external rent inflows (Kemal 2007; Husain 2010). Some 
studies show that growth in the manufacturing sector remained input-driven rather 
than productivity-driven over this period (Chaudhry 2009). A working paper of the 
State Bank of Pakistan concludes that trade openness had a negative correlation 
with TFP growth while government consumption and FDI were positively correlated 
(S. U. Khan 2006). Most empirical studies of this period agree that growth was driven 
by the service sector and manufacturing growth suffered from low productivity and 
competitiveness. A cross country report by UNIDO on competitive industrial 
performance (CIP) shows that Pakistan’s competitiveness since liberalization has 
shown a downward trend. The same report also identifies an aggregate 
competitiveness problem in India but its performance was relatively better than that 
of Pakistan. Pakistan’s manufacturing value added per capita was close to India’s in 
1990  but by 2000 it had fallen to 70 per cent of India’s and 18 per cent of China’s 
(Table 7.10). Significantly the value of manufactured exports per capita was 165 per 
cent higher than that of India in 1990 and even exceeded China by 7 per cent. But by 
2000 this figure had dropped considerably to become only 58 per cent higher than 
India (Ansari 2005). Pakistan’s higher manufacturing exports per capita reflect the 
initially greater export orientation of Pakistan’s manufacturing sector. The 
interesting feature is the time trend in export performance relative to India. 
Some level of volatility is expected in manufacturing performance in developing 
countries, but the trends in productivity and competitiveness in Pakistan’s case 
suggest that liberalization has had an adverse effect on competitive capabilities. This 
is consistent with our qualitative finding that there were no capability development 
strategies in the 1980s and 1990s even of the type that Pakistan attempted in the 
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1960s and the results are validated in productivity and competitiveness indicators 
for the manufacturing sector (Tables 7.9 and 7.10).  The growth of the financial 
sector did not translate into more innovative credit instruments that could assist 
capability development in Pakistani manufacturing. Interestingly the ten largest 
corporate groups in India, including Reliance, Essar and Adani, have an average net 
debt to EBITDA (earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization) ratio of 
5.6 and are probably excessively overleveraged as a ratio above 5 is considered 
unsustainable (Crabtree 2013). In contrast, Pakistan’s corporate sector displays the 
opposite problem. The equity to debt ratio of 8:2 suggests they rely far too much on 
internal resources for investment and have limited access to acceptable terms of 
credit from the banking sector. According to Husain if this ratio could be reduced to 
7:3 the country’s investment to GDP ratio would move up to 21.2 per cent from 20 
per cent (Husain 2007). Arguably, financial liberalization has not served the 
manufacturing sector even though this was one of the reasons cited for liberalization 
in the 1990s. In India’s case the figure quoted above is probably evidence of 
liberalization increasingly serving narrow, and increasingly unproductive interests as 
highlighted in Chapter Four. 
 
Year 60-04 60-69 70-79 80-89 90-99 00-04 
Real 
GDP 
Growth 
 5.4 6.31 4.9 6.3 4.4 4.5 
Capital  1.9 2.1 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.6 
Labour  1.8 1.6 2.0 1.8 1.7 2 
TFP  1.7 2.6 1.1 2.6 0.8 0.8 
 
Table 7.9. TFP growth in Pakistan 
Source IMF 2005 quoted in (Husain 2010) Table 5 
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                  1990                        2000 
 MVA 
per 
capita 
USD 
MHT 
in 
MVA 
(%) 
MX 
per 
capita 
USD 
MHT in 
mfg 
exports (%) 
MVA 
per 
capita 
USD 
MHT 
in 
MVA 
(%) 
MX 
per 
capita 
USD 
MHT in 
mfg 
exports (%) 
Pakistan 56 31.9 45 8.1 63 35.1 60 8.9 
China 113 57.6 42 34.4 350 57.3 183 44.6 
India 60 55.3 17 17.9 90 58.4 38 19.7 
 
Table 7.10. Pakistan’s declining competitiveness 
(Competition as measured by the Competitiveness Industrial Performance Index) 
MVA- Manufacturing Value Added 
MHT- Medium and High Technology 
MX- Manufactured Exports 
Source: UNIDO quoted in (Ansari 2005), Table 2 
 
Our comparison of Pakistan with India suggests that while there are differences 
there is also much in common in the challenges faced by the two countries. Their per 
capita incomes are fairly close and in terms of indicators like poverty and inequality 
they are also very similar. Both adopted liberalization reforms in the early 1990s that 
led to the rapid growth of the service sector. However as outlined in Chapter Four 
India adopted liberalization reforms when at least a few of its important 
manufacturing sectors like automobiles and pharmaceuticals had achieved global 
competitiveness. Despite this, the Indian economy still suffers from market failures 
in finance that impede manufacturing companies from achieving greater 
competiveness and new manufacturing sectors emerging. In the case of Pakistan, 
liberalization happened at a time when it did not have any major sectors of 
manufacturing that were reasonably close to the global competitiveness frontier.  
Yet Pakistan’s manufacturing included sectors like textiles, simple electronics and 
surgical instruments that could have benefited from capability development 
strategies. There is no evidence in Pakistan of the type of capability development 
strategy in the Indian automobile sector outlined in Chapter Four and Khan (2009a). 
This is despite Pakistan having an auto components and assembly sector which may 
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have benefited from similar incentives for technical and organizational capability 
development. The textile industry is Pakistan’s most critical industry in terms of its 
contribution to the economy. Pakistan is the fourth largest producer of cotton with a 
nine per cent share of the world market. Its textile industry accounted for 54 per 
cent of exports, 38 per cent of industrial employment and 8.5 per cent of GDP in 
2011.  But the textile sector also faces ‘significant productivity and quality gaps’ 
(Iqbal, et al. 2010). It still operates at the low end of the value chain rather than high 
value added products. The chief constraint in the sector despite relatively low wages 
is the lack of technical and organizational capabilities to compete in global markets. 
Pakistan is also trying to be a significant player in the ready-made garments sector 
but has some way to go before it can catch up with Bangladesh. Given that the 
average total cost per operator hour in the case of Bangladesh is $0.31 and 
Pakistan’s is almost double that at $0.56, it faces a significant challenge in raising 
productivity and quality enough to compensate for its initial cost disadvantage 
(PRGMEA 2010). These are unlikely to happen without adequate policies. 
The Sialkot industrial cluster producing high quality surgical instruments for western 
export markets is one of Pakistan’s successful manufacturing sectors. The sector 
exports close to 90 percent of its production and was established in the 1960s under 
Ayub Khan’s industrial policies. It was an early beneficiary of export incentives. It is 
already at a higher end of technical competence than the cotton textile industry and 
exports to high income markets. In 2008-09 Pakistan exported surgical instruments 
worth $250 million mostly to the US with the sector employing about 150,000 
workers. Like much of the developing world’s success stories government policy was 
important in pushing the sector up the value chain. In 1994 significant quality 
requirements were imposed by the American Food and Drug Authority (FDA) on 
imported surgical instruments. Given the importance of the sector, manufacturers 
reached an understanding with the government to provide the necessary training to 
employees that would enable the sector to compete on the terms required by the 
FDA (Nadvi 1999). This collaboration required limited public funds or monitoring 
because the sector already had high capability and a strong incentive to improve its 
quality to keep its market. It was one of the few examples of successful capability 
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improvement with government assistance in the 1990s when the political settlement 
was competitive clientelist. The effort proved a success and Pakistan was able to 
regain its lost share in the export market.  
The Pakistani government has since delinked itself from direct involvement in the 
sector, but the successful outcome suggests that these linkages should be 
maintained for pragmatic capability development initiatives. The PML-N government 
of Sharif that was involved in this initiative was not anti-industry but it was also not 
pro-actively promoting industry. The extensive privatization programmes of the 
1990s provided the PML-N with enough opportunities for rent allocation without 
difficult strategies of promoting industrialization through capability development. A 
report of the Rawalpindi Chamber of Commerce identifies why government 
assistance is necessary for addressing productivity and competitiveness problems 
(Aaliya 2010). Training and re-skilling are consistently identified as bottlenecks and 
we would add the problems of organizational capability development, which 
requires learning-by-doing strategies. All these competitiveness enhancing strategies 
require financing and an appropriate design of the governance of the financing 
strategy so that financing is not captured as an unproductive rent. The report says 
that despite the presence of many banks and leasing companies, access to finance is 
only easy for large companies who have good personal relations with the banks. 
Small vendors have limited access and face higher financing costs, making 
investments in raising competitiveness risky and costly. Small and medium 
manufacturing and agro based industries remain ‘credit-starved’ (Husain 2007).  
A sector that has the potential to transform the fortunes of Pakistan’s manufacturing 
industry is the auto and auto components sector. Till the 1970s the automobile 
sector in Pakistan relied on simple assembly of imported kits and early attempts at 
localization did not succeed. The Pakistan Automobile Corporation (PACO) was set 
up under the Bhutto administration to manufacture cars locally and consisted of two 
segments: Pak-Suzuki in collaboration with Suzuki of Japan and Millat Tractors (the 
latter was nationalized having been established in 1964 to market Massey Ferguson 
Tractors in Pakistan). While the economic policies of the Bhutto era are often 
52 
 
criticized for setting back the pace of Pakistan’s industrial growth some sectors 
actually benefited from these dirigiste policies. The automotive sector was certainly 
one of them. Pak-Suzuki was the largest auto company in the country and Millat 
Tractors emerged as one of the country’s leading manufacturing companies looking 
to export to markets like Afghanistan and some African countries by the early 2000s.  
A comparison with India’s auto sector is useful here. It is significant that Maruti 
Suzuki made its entry into India’s protected market almost a decade after PACO was 
established and played the role of a catalyst in developing India’s auto sector. One 
difference stands out clearly. Unlike India where the auto sector was protected till 
liberalization in the 1990s the Pakistani auto market was dominated by imports till 
1971. The long period of protection had allowed India to achieve significant learning 
by doing even if it produced very low quality cars and heavy commercial vehicles. 
Nevertheless, India had achieved the capabilities to make these vehicles entirely 
within India. When Suzuki came to India it was promised significant implicit rents in 
the protected market (as well as other explicit subsidies like the allocation of prime 
land) as long as it achieved significant local content in five years based on developing 
the technological and organizational capabilities of tier one and two component 
producers. The ex-post rents offered to Suzuki and the possibility of actually 
achieving the indigenization given the high initial capabilities encouraged Suzuki to 
accept this deal. It was able to roll out cars with the required levels of indigenization 
by the 1990s. The consequent development of Suzuki’s vendor base led to the 
growth of India’s auto component sector that today has two successful indigenous 
auto manufacturers, Mahindra & Mahindra and Tata Motors. India’s auto 
component manufacturing sector is also one of Asia’s most competitive. It would not 
be inaccurate to say the long period of protection had positive dynamic 
consequences for India despite significant short-term inefficiencies (M. H. Khan 
2009a, 2013b, 2013a). 
Pakistan did not have a strong initial capability base in automobile manufacturing in 
1971 and could not set ambitious targets for Suzuki in the 1970s that India could in 
the 1980s. Given that the manufacture of tractor parts was technically and 
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organizationally less complex compared to car components it was this sector that 
saw the most growth (Ghani and Khan 2004). However since the 1990s a process 
similar to the one observed in India’s auto sector was unfolding in the Pakistani auto 
sector in scope if not in scale. The opening up of the market to foreign 
manufacturers meant they were able to make use of the base developed by Pak 
Suzuki, and Honda and Toyota also set up assembling and manufacturing operations. 
As a result some auto component producers like Ragstar Engineering achieved high 
levels of export competitiveness. The Pakistani government established programmes 
like the National Trade Corridor Improvement Program (NTCIP) and the Auto 
Industry Development Program (AIDP). However, policymakers failed to come up 
with instruments for financing capability development that ensured compulsions for 
high-effort learning. This failure can be understood given the difficulties of enforcing 
formal instruments in the political settlement in Pakistan that was gradually moving 
in the direction of weaker enforcement and time horizons.  
 
Figure 7.2. Automobile sales figures from 2008-09 to 2012-13 
Source: (PAMA 2013) 
Note- Wheelers are 2/3 wheelers (scooters, motorcycles, ‘tempos’) 
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Automobile production has not broken through to achieve global competitiveness. 
Production was low in the 2010s with production in 2012-13 being at its lowest level 
since 2009-10 (Figure XXX). Tractor production figures are somewhat better, picking 
up in 2012-13 after a period of low growth, but two and three wheeler sales have 
been the most robust reflecting the relative competitiveness of Pakistani vehicles at 
the lower end (PAMA 2013). The policy and academic literature on the automobile 
sector uniformly mentions the important role of government and why it needs to do 
more despite initiatives like the NTCIP and AIDP. A crucial problem here is the 
relationship between economic organizations in the sector and the ruling coalition. 
The Indian auto and auto components producers in Tamil Nadu had historical links 
with different parties who could constitute the ruling coalition. The ability of the 
ruling coalition to direct rents to their clients in the business sector in a context of 
competition between firms and between political parties made rents available for 
capability development with competitive compulsions for raising productivity. The 
configuration of economic and political organizations in Pakistan was less favourable 
for rent allocations that could create compulsions for capability development. There 
were too few players in the automobile sector, their capabilities were not close to 
global competitiveness and political organizations in the 1980s and 1990s had weak 
implementation capabilities and short time horizons. Credible support for high effort 
capability development therefore did not emerge.  
A few qualifications on the measures of competitiveness in existing studies are 
needed here. Studies on competitiveness carried out by the World Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) and the Competitiveness Support Fund (CSF) have been 
influential in policy circles but they have also and rightly come in for some criticism 
for the particular indicators they use. They rely on indicators like education or infant 
mortality that are useful in their own right but have little necessary bearing on levels 
of competitiveness. Some of the data also suffers from selection bias and is 
unrepresentative. For instance the Executive Opinion Survey in the CSF report was 
conducted among Pakistani executives who work in firms with more than 100 
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employees, when most of Pakistani business is concentrated in the small scale sector 
(McCartney 2011). The UNIDO report is less biased towards inappropriate ‘good 
governance indicators’ of the sort used in the ADB, WB and CSF reports and relies 
more on measures of per capita MVA or manufactured exports, but these measure 
competitiveness by looking at its outcomes. In the UNIDO report there are also 
problems with assigning equal weight to all indicators and not adequately 
differentiating between assembly and manufacturing (Ansari 2005). Yet it is arguably 
the index that comes closest to measuring true competitiveness (see our discussion 
in Chapter four) unlike measures based on good governance indicators of 
competitiveness like security of property rights and democracy.  
Finally, privatization has been a much bigger programme in Pakistan than in India but 
it has not achieved significant results. Privatization will only lead to greater static and 
dynamic efficiency if firms are capable of competing in a more open economy and if 
privatization reduces the unconditional support given to firms by different types of 
explicit and hidden subsidies. Hidden subsidies to large business organizations in 
Pakistan come from a variety of mechanisms including bank loans on soft terms, and 
these remain politically easy to access for large private sector firms (Khwaja and 
Mian). Indeed, privatization was a mechanism for directing further rents the 
politically connected business organizations. Between 1990 and 2004 the sectors 
that accounted for the largest share in privatization proceeds were banking, energy 
and telecommunications, sectors (Syed, et al. 2012) that are not linked directly to 
manufacturing growth and capability development. The preponderance of 
privatization in banking would also support our conclusion in Section 7.5 that this 
sector provided easy rents for both political and business organizations while leaving 
out the intermediate class from the processes of accumulation. Thus, the 
implementation of privatization and liberalization in the context of the configuration 
of power in Pakistan did not create significant pressures for capability development 
and more importantly, reduced the policy space for interventions that could assist 
capability development except in a small number of cases.  
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A Government of Pakistan Labour Force Survey in 2003-04 concluded that the 
majority of new jobs were created in the country’s unorganized, informal economy 
the share of which in non-agricultural employment was 70 percent (Aftab 2006). Two 
recent studies on the impact of the SAPs have found they have had an adverse effect 
on indicators like employment, poverty, income distribution and export performance 
(Nosheen, et al. 2010; R. E. A. Khan, et al. 2011). As Table 7.8 and 7.9 suggest per 
capita GDP growth rates remained low throughout the period of SAP reforms and 
export growth suffered. Liberalization reforms in Pakistan had poor effects because 
the country was neither politically nor economically ready to be an open economy. It 
did not have a broad base of economic organizations close to the competitiveness 
frontier and its political organizations were becoming weaker and facing greater 
contestation, which reduced their enforcement capabilities and eventually resulted 
in high levels of political instability and violence. Liberalization enabled a very small 
section of the population to reap benefits through the growth of the service sector 
and through informal rent allocations that continued through the banking system, 
through privatizations and overt forms of ‘primitive accumulation’. Most economic 
and social indicators suggest the majority of Pakistan’s population remained outside 
this ‘globalized’ economy. This is where significant structural similarities remain with 
India whose liberalization strategies are proving to be inadequate for driving further 
growth (M. H. Khan 2011b). The structural exclusion of Pakistan’s excluded social 
groups is however greater than in India and the declining legitimacy of the 
traditional political organizations creates challenges for maintaining stability. 
7.8 Conclusion 
The application of the political settlement approach to Pakistan provides a number 
of insights. The mainstream discourse on Pakistan highlights the absence of right 
institutions especially democratic ones, the presence of corruption and the growth 
of Islamism as the sources of Pakistan’s problems. Our analysis suggests a different 
set of problems. First, the founding myths of Pakistan and the security prioritization 
it allowed created a more centralized rent distribution system that failed to 
increasingly integrate emerging mobilizations within the intermediate classes. At the 
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same time, the political settlement that had allowed substantial capability 
development interventions in the 1960s became progressively less conducive for 
interventions that could address these market failures in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Exacerbating the problem was the strengthening of liberalizing ideologies in this 
period that led to the deliberate abandonment of capability development strategies 
in this period. By the 2000s Pakistan was in the double bind of lacking capability 
building strategies for its economic organizations while its political organizations 
faced growing challenges from new more informally organized political organizations 
that want to overthrow the system and not just claim a share of rents.  
Capability development strategies were most successful in Pakistan immediately 
after the onset of military rule in 1958 under Ayub Khan. The ruling coalition did not 
have the capacity to discipline subsidy recipients as in East Asia, but significant 
capability development happened, financed by public subsidies. The problem was 
that that vulnerable patrimonialism excluded too many powerful organizations and 
resulted in political conflict and the violent rupture of 1971.  
This was followed from 1972 to 1977 by Bhutto’s attempt to create a dominant party 
in a version of constrained patrimonialism with authoritarian characteristics. He used 
the populist slogan of Islamic socialism to sustain an authoritarian party. There were 
a few successes in setting up capability development projects, as in automobiles, and 
some public sector investments, but his period was marked by an attack on 
Pakistan’s big capitalist that generally served to destroy productive and 
organizational capabilities. A second phase of military rule under general Zia-ul-haq 
was a significant turning point towards Pakistan’s current impasse. The availability of 
centralized security-related rents associated with support for the Americans in 
Afghanistan and a failed attempt to destroy the old political organizations without 
successfully incorporating organizations representing the lower intermediate classes 
set the characteristics of the unstable political settlement that continues to affect 
Pakistan. Economic liberalization began in the 1980s as the military ruling coalition 
relied more on external rents and took less interest in capability development.  
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Zia’s death brought in an era of deepening liberalization and structural adjustments 
under weak political governments in an intensely competitive clientelist political 
settlement. Economic organizations were too weak to dominate the political system 
and negotiate support for capability development, but individual business groups 
were powerful enough and well-enough connected to political organizations to 
sustain their rents through informal mechanisms like bank loans, and primitive 
accumulation based on getting government contracts and land allocations. Sectors 
like textiles and the successful surgical instruments sector soldiered on but did not 
enjoy the support for capability development that could have pushed them into 
more diversified and higher valued products. At the same time, the alienation of 
excluded groups increased as the traditional political parties engaged in more and 
more egregious corruption and unproductive rent capture.  
Islam in Pakistan gradually progressed from being the identity of Muslim elites in 
British India mobilizing to protect their access to rents in a democratic independent 
India where they would be a perpetual minority to the mobilizing ideology of 
excluded groups within Pakistan. To isolate the ruling groups who are also Muslims 
but who subscribe to more ‘liberal’ forms of Islam, it is not surprising that excluded 
groups would distinguish themselves by defining Islam in a form that is guaranteed 
to isolate the ruling elites. The sometimes misguided attempt by military and 
traditional political elites to use Islam to consolidate their own support is only part of 
the explanation for the growing mobilization of the excluded using increasingly 
radical Islamic ideologies. The logic of the political contest over rents suggests that 
radical Islamism would probably have emerged anyway as long as the political 
organizations controlled by higher level elites failed to rapidly incorporate 
organizations led by and catering to the political ambitions of lower intermediate 
class groups.  
This is the context in which local religious leaders, or mullahs, who were once at the 
bottom of the social hierarchy in regions like FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa relative 
to the landowning maliks and the educated ulemas, gradually became leaders of 
political mobilizations (Dorronsoro 2002; Lieven 2011). These leaders have 
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overturned the social hierarchy in many places and displaced the maliks and amirs to 
fill the vacuum the Pakistani state had never really filled (Lieven 2011). We have 
argued that the emergence of violent political conflicts and strategies of radically 
targeting the social order rather than demanding incorporation is similar to the 
experience of Maoist movements in India. The failure to gradually incorporate 
marginalized groups in rent distribution systems can result in the emergence of 
radical rejectionist movements. Class divisions superimposed on the failure of 
inclusion of potentially powerful groups within the political settlement can explain 
these outcomes, with culture and ideology playing a secondary role in explaining the 
mobilization ideologies. The role of class conflicts and failed clientelist strategies of 
inclusion and exclusion in explaining the rise of movements like that of the Taliban 
and other rejectionist social movements in Pakistan and India is an area of research 
that needs to be developed further in the future. 
Islamic culture is often wrongly used to explain Taliban radicalism. A distinction has 
to be made between Islam as a set of cultural norms and its role as a mobilizing 
ideology for different types of social movements. In fact Islam has been used as a 
mobilizing ideology by many different types of groups and classes in South Asia with 
very different strategies that can be understood and explained in the context of 
specific contests over assets and rents. The new mobilizations using Islam in Pakistan 
are novel because a history of exclusion of certain classes and groups has resulted in 
Islam being used for nothing less than a complete restructuring of the political 
settlement. Our analysis of political settlements adds further depth to approaches 
that have argued that Islam as culture does not explain much about the specific 
characteristics of different political and economic mobilizations.  
The political settlement in Pakistan in the 2010s seems to be sustainable only in the 
form of a medium-term impasse. The ruling coalition still has access to enough rents 
to sustain their hold over power but the excluded organizations are also displaying 
high holding power through their mobilizations that are often violent. The low 
enforcement capabilities of political and bureaucratic organizations also mean that 
strategies of creating new productive capabilities are likely to face significant 
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constraints. Economic organizations are too weak in terms of political power and 
economic capabilities to define a productive policy agenda. But many are well-
enough connected to benefit from quick rent opportunities that can be shared with 
their political allies. These emerging features of unproductive business-government 
relationships are common to both India and Pakistan. The political settlement in 
Pakistan can and should change but this is a political process and not a technical or 
economic one that is amenable to policy in any simple way. Clearly, the 
incorporation of significant layers of new groups and organizations into the political 
settlement not just marginally, but as important players, is necessary if political 
stability is to be achieved. How this can be done when established elites still believe 
that the principle battle they are fighting is against Islamist extremism that on is a 
political challenge that will have to be faced by Pakistani political entrepreneurs. The 
political settlement analysis suggests that this type of organizational restructuring 
can only evolve internally and cannot be achieved through the interventions of 
external agencies. The conventional security and governance agenda assumes that 
with appropriate support to the Pakistani elite, groups like the Taliban can be wiped 
out. By locating the emergence of these challenges to Pakistan’s established elites in 
the context of failed strategies of exclusion we contend that strategies of continuing 
this exclusion through the use of more force are likely to fail in the long-run and 
indeed result in even more violent and radical responses from below.  
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